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Abstract
We study implicational formulas in the context of proof complexity of intuitionistic
propositional logic (IPC). On the one hand, we give an efficient transformation of tau-
tologies to implicational tautologies that preserves the lengths of intuitionistic extended
Frege (EF ) or substitution Frege (SF ) proofs up to a polynomial. On the other hand,
EF proofs in the implicational fragment of IPC polynomially simulate full intuitionistic
logic for implicational tautologies. The results also apply to other fragments of other
superintuitionistic logics under certain conditions.
In particular, the exponential lower bounds on the length of intuitionistic EF proofs
by Hrubesˇ [9], generalized to exponential separation between EF and SF systems in
superintuitionistic logics of unbounded branching by Jerˇa´bek [12], can be realized by
implicational tautologies.
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1 Introduction
A major open problem in proof complexity is to show superpolynomial lower bounds on the
lengths of proofs in Frege systems for classical propositional logic, or even stronger systems
such as extended Frege. It turns out such lower bounds are easier to obtain for some non-
classical logics: Hrubesˇ proved exponential lower bounds on the length of EF proofs1 for
certain modal logics and for intuitionistic logic [8, 9, 10]. Jerˇa´bek [12] improved these results
to an exponential separation between EF and SF systems for all superintuitionistic (and
transitive modal) logics of unbounded branching. See also [3, 4] for earlier work on the proof
complexity of intuitionistic logic, including conditional lower bounds.
Known lower bounds on proof systems for non-classical logics crucially rely on variants
of the feasible disjunction property, serving a similar role as feasible interpolation does in
weak proof systems for classical logic (cf. [15]). Consequently, the lower bounds are proved
for tautologies that involve disjunction in an essential way, and one might get the impression
1The results are formulated in [8, 9, 10] as lower bounds on the number of lines in Frege proofs, however,
this is essentially the same measure as the length of extended Frege proofs.
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that this is unavoidable—perhaps the implicational fragment of IPC, or other disjunction-free
fragments, behave differently from the full logic.
The purpose of this paper is to show that this dependence on disjunctions is just an
artifact of the proofs: the implicational fragment of intuitionistic logic is, after all, essentially
equivalent to the full logic with respect to the lengths of proofs. We will demonstrate this
by means of two kinds of results: first, tautologies can be brought into a form avoiding
unwanted connectives (such as disjunction) while preserving their hardness for intuitionistic
extended Frege and related systems; second, unwanted connectives can be eliminated from
intuitionistic extended Frege proofs except for subformulas of the tautology being proved. We
include several results of both kinds with varying assumptions.
Elimination results of the first kind are the topic of Section 3. On the one hand, in
Theorem 3.6 we present a method that makes tautologies mostly implicational with certain
disjunctions and ⊥ left, and preserves (up to a polynomial) the size of F , EF , and SF proofs in
arbitrary superintuitionistic logics; in particular, the tautologies with exponential EF lower
bounds from [9, 12] can be made purely implicational in this way. On the other hand, in
Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 we show how to eliminate all disjunctions (and/or ⊥) from tautologies
while preserving the lengths of EF and SF proofs in logics whose proper axioms do not
contain disjunctions (⊥, respectively).
Elimination results of the second kind come in Section 4. In Theorem 4.3, we show that if
the proper axioms of a logic L do not contain disjunction (or ⊥), we can efficiently eliminate
disjunctions (⊥, resp.) from L-EF proofs, except for those that appear in the final tautol-
ogy. However, the argument may introduce conjunctions, and we address this in subsequent
results: in Corollary 4.15 and Theorem 4.17, we show how to eliminate conjunctions from
EF -proofs under some conditions on the logic and its axiom system; in Theorem 4.5, we show
how to eliminate ⊥ from proofs without introducing ∧ or other connectives, again under cer-
tain conditions on the logic. We also develop a monotone version of the negative translation
(Proposition 4.19), which we use in an ad hoc argument that the above-mentioned implica-
tional versions of the tautologies used in [12] to separate EF and SF have short implicational
IPC-SF proofs (Theorem 4.22).
A few concluding remarks and open problems are mentioned in Section 5.
In order to show the limitations of our methods, the appendices include some negative
results that may be of independent interest. Proposition A.5, originally due to Wron´ski [18],
shows that in general, the implicational fragment of a superintuitionistic logic L = IPC+Φ
with Φ an implicational axiom may not be axiomatized by Φ over the implicational fragment
of IPC, and similarly for other combinations where the target fragment omits conjunction.
Appendix B presents certain exponential lower bounds on the size of formulas in fragments
of intuitionistic logic, and a linear lower bound on implication nesting depth.
2 Preliminaries
We refer to Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [5] and Kraj´ıcˇek [14] for general information on
superintuitionistic logics and classical Frege systems and their extensions, respectively. For
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Frege and friends in superintuitionistic logics, we will use the notation and basic results from
Jerˇa´bek [12]; we include more details below, as we need to generalize the set-up to fragments
(e.g., implicational) of si logics, which were not treated in [12].
If L is a language2, a proof system for L is a polynomial-time computable function P (x)
whose range is L. If P (x) = y, the string x is called a P -proof of y. A proof system P
polynomially-simulates or p-simulates a proof system Q, denoted Q ≤p P , if there is a poly-
time function f such that Q(x) = P (f(x)) for all proofs x. Proof systems P and Q are
p-equivalent, written P ≡p Q, if P ≤p Q ≤p P .
A propositional language is a set C of connectives, each given a finite arity. (That is,
formally, a language is a mapping ar : C → ω.) Let C denote the set of C-formulas, built
from propositional variables pi, i ∈ ω, using connectives from C. We will also denote variables
by other lowercase Latin letters for convenience, and we will denote formulas by lowercase
Greek letters. We write ψ ⊆ ϕ if ψ is a subformula of ϕ. A substitution is a mapping of
variables to formulas, uniquely extended to a homomorphism C →C . A propositional logic is
a pair L = 〈C,⊢L〉, where C is a propositional language, and ⊢L is a structural Tarski-style
consequence relation: i.e., a relation ⊢L ⊆ P(C)×C satisfying
(i) ϕ ∈ Γ implies Γ ⊢L ϕ;
(ii) if ∆ ⊢L ϕ, and Γ ⊢L ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆, then Γ ⊢L ϕ;
(iii) Γ ⊢L ϕ implies σ(Γ) ⊢L σ(ϕ)
for all formulas ϕ, sets of formulas Γ, ∆, and substitutions σ. We will only be interested in
finitary logics, meaning Γ ⊢L ϕ implies Γ0 ⊢L ϕ for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ.
If L is a logic in a finite (or computable) language C, a proof system for L is a proof system
(in the sense given above) for the set {ϕ : ⊢L ϕ} of L-tautologies; a derivation system for L
is a proof system for its finitary consequence relation {〈ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 : ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢L ϕ0}.
Let L = 〈C,⊢L〉 be a logic. An extension of L is a logic L
′ = 〈C ′,⊢L′〉 such that C ⊆ C
′
and ⊢L ⊆ ⊢L′ ; we will write L ⊆ L
′. An extension is simple if C = C ′. If X is a set of
C-formulas, then L+X is the least extension of L such that ⊢L+X ϕ for all ϕ ∈ X. Logics of
the form L+X are called axiomatic extensions of L. For any C ′ ⊆ C, the C ′-fragment of L,
denoted LC′ , is the logic 〈C
′,⊢L ∩ (P(C′)×C′)〉.
Fix a language C. A Frege rule is an object of the form
α1, . . . , αk
α0
, also written as α1, . . . , αk / α0,
where α0, . . . , αk are formulas. Rules with k = 0 can be identified with formulas, and are
called axioms. If L is a logic, a rule α1, . . . , αk / α0 is L-derivable if α1, . . . , αk ⊢L α0.
If R is a set of Frege rules, an R-derivation of ϕ from Γ ⊆C is a sequence of formulas
ϕ1, . . . , ϕm, where ϕm = ϕ, and each ϕi is an element of Γ, or is derived from some of the
formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1 by a substitution instance of a rule from R. An R-proof of ϕ is its
R-derivation from Γ = ∅. If L is a logic such that
Γ ⊢L ϕ iff ϕ has an R-derivation from Γ
2In the sense of the theory of computation, i.e., an arbitrary set of strings over a finite alphabet.
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for all Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆C , we say that R is an axiomatization of L; if R is furthermore finite, we call
the R-derivation system a Frege system for L, and denote it L-F . This notation is justified
by the next observation:
Lemma 2.1 Substitution instances of a fixed L-derivable rule have linear-time constructible
proofs in any L-F system. Consequently, all Frege systems for L are p-equivalent. 
Notice that our definition is more strict than the one employed in [16, 11], which only requires
Frege systems to respect the tautologies of the logic rather than its consequence relation.
The formulas ϕi in a Frege derivation ϕ1, . . . , ϕm are called lines; thus, the number of
lines in the derivation is m, whereas its size or length is its total size when written out as a
string in a fixed finite alphabet, i.e., essentially
∑
i|ϕi|.
The logics we will work with in this paper are extensions of intuitionistic logic (denoted
IPC) and their fragments. We formulate IPC in the language CIPC = {→,∧,∨,⊥}. We
define ¬ϕ = (ϕ → ⊥) as an abbreviation. Conversely, ⊥ is equivalent to ¬(p → p); since
implication will always be present in our fragments, we could equally well formulate all re-
sults using ¬ instead of ⊥ as a basic connective, but we feel ⊥ is more convenient. We can
also define ⊤ as ⊥ → ⊥ or p → p, and (ϕ ↔ ψ) = (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). We will call
{→}-formulas implicational (or purely implicational for emphasis), {→,∧,∨}-formulas posi-
tive, {∧,∨,⊥,⊤}-formulas monotone, and {∧,∨}-formulas strict monotone. (Every monotone
formula is equivalent to ⊥, ⊤, or to a strict monotone formula.)
In order not to get overwhelmed by brackets, we employ the notational conventions that
the outermost bracket can be omitted, ∧ and ∨ bind more strongly than →, and → is right-
associative, so that e.g.,
ϕ0 → · · · → ϕn−1 → ψ ∧ χ = (ϕ0 → (· · · → (ϕn−1 → (ψ ∧ χ)) · · · )).
If Γ = 〈ϕi : i < n〉 is a sequence of formulas, we will write
Γ→ ϕ = ϕ0 → · · · → ϕn−1 → ϕ,
understood as just ϕ if n = 0. Any formula ϕ can be uniquely written in the form Γ → ξ,
where Γ is a sequence of formulas, and ξ is not an implication. We will call ξ the head of ϕ,
and write H(ϕ) = ξ.
We can axiomatize IPC by the rule of modus ponens
α,α→ β / β, (1)
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and the axioms
(α→ β → γ)→ (α→ β)→ α→ γ, (2)
α→ β → α, (3)
α ∧ β → α, (4)
α ∧ β → β, (5)
α→ β → α ∧ β, (6)
α→ α ∨ β, (7)
β → α ∨ β, (8)
α ∨ β → (α→ γ)→ (β → γ)→ γ, (9)
⊥ → γ. (10)
The Frege system for IPC based on the rules (1)–(10) will be called the standard IPC-F
system.
Superintuitionistic (si) logics are axiomatic extensions of IPC. The largest consistent
si logic is classical logic, which we will denote CPC. Only finitely axiomatizable logics have
Frege systems, hence unless stated otherwise, we will tacitly assume that all logics mentioned
are finitely axiomatizable.
We will rarely need to use Kripke semantics for si logics, as most of our arguments are
purely syntactic; we refer the reader to [5, 12].
Apart from si logics themselves, we will be interested in proof systems for fragments LC ,
where L is a si logic, and → ∈ C ⊆ CIPC. (We warn the reader that fragments of finitely
axiomatized logics are not necessarily finitely axiomatizable, and axiomatic extensions of
IPCC are not necessarily fragments of si logics.) Notice that if finitely axiomatizable, LC
can be axiomatized by a single formula over IPCC : in particular, IPCC + {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} can
be axiomatized by
(ϕ1 → · · · → ϕk → p)→ p,
where p is a variable not occurring in ϕ1, . . . , ϕk. It is well known (see e.g. [7], using a
slightly different calculus) that the standard axiom system for IPC above has the property
of separation of connectives for fragments that include implication: IPCC is axiomatizable
by modus ponens and those axioms among (2)–(10) that only use connectives from C. Thus,
an LC-F system axiomatized by (1), the C-axioms among (2)–(10), and one other C-formula
(called the proper axiom of the given axiom system) will be called a standard Frege system
for LC .
We mention that si logics split in four types according to which connectives need to appear
in their proper axioms. First, no consistent proper extension of IPC can be axiomatized by
monotone formulas, hence → is (nearly) always required. On the other hand, conjunction is
never needed:
Lemma 2.2 Let C ⊆ {→,∨,⊥}. Every (C ∪ {∧})-formula is in IPC equivalent to a con-
junction of C-formulas.
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Proof: By induction on the complexity of the formula, using(∧
i<n
ϕi
)
∨
( ∧
j<m
ψj
)
↔
∧
i<n
j<m
(ϕi ∨ ψj), (11)
(∧
i<n
ϕi →
∧
j<m
ψj
)
↔
∧
j<m
(ϕ0 → · · · → ϕn−1 → ψj). (12)

Thus, the only question is whether axioms of L need to use ∨ and/or ⊥, and this can be
characterized semantically (see [5] for a detailed explanation): L can be axiomatized by
{→,∨}-formulas (or: by positive formulas) iff the class of L-frames is closed under so-called
dense subframes (cf. [5, §9.1]); L is axiomatizable by {→,⊥}-formulas (or: by ∨-free formulas)
iff it is a cofinal-subframe logic (cf. [5, §11.3]); and L is axiomatizable by →-formulas (or: by
positive ∨-free formulas) iff it is a subframe logic iff it is both positively axiomatizable and
cofinal-subframe.
For any Frege system L-F , we will also consider several associated stronger systems based
on the same set of Frege rules. The extended Frege system L-EF is defined as follows:
an L-EF derivation of ϕ from a finite set Γ is an L-F derivation of ϕ from Γ ∪ E, where
E = {E1, . . . , Er} is a list of extension axioms: each Ei is a pair of implications
3
qi → ψi, ψi → qi,
where the extension variables qi are distinct, and qi does not occur in {ψj : j ≤ i} ∪ {ϕ} ∪ Γ.
Alternatively, the circuit Frege system L-CF is defined similarly to Frege, except that lines in
derivations can be represented by circuits rather than just formulas. In the substitution Frege
system L-SF , substitution can be used as a rule of inference along with Frege rules. Unlike
the other systems, L-SF only makes sense as a proof system, not as a derivation system. If
P is any of the sequence-like (dag-like) proof systems we introduced, P ∗ denotes its tree-like
version.
Lemma 2.1 also applies to L-EF , L-CF , and L-SF , but the case of tree-like systems is
more complicated (see [12, §3.1]).
Before embarking on the basic properties of these systems, let us mention a technical
lemma that allows us to work with chained implications Γ→ ϕ with more ease. It is reason-
ably clear that the formulas below have short IPC-F proofs, but it may be less obvious how
to derive them shortly in the implicational fragment IPC→ without the use of conjunctions.
Lemma 2.3
(i) Given Γ, ∆, and ϕ such that every formula in Γ appears in ∆, we can construct in
polynomial time an IPC→-F proof of
(Γ→ ϕ)→ (∆→ ϕ).
3This formulation of EF is tailored to fragments of si logics. In general, we can reasonably define EF
for (finitary, finitely axiomatized) logics that are finitely equivalential in the sense of abstract algebraic logic,
where the set of equivalence formulas will play the role of {x→ y, y → x} in extension axioms.
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(ii) Given Γ, ϕ, and ∆ = 〈ψi : i < n〉, we can construct in polynomial time an IPC→-F
proof of
(∆→ ϕ)→ (Γ→ ψ0)→ · · · → (Γ→ ψn−1)→ (Γ→ ϕ).
Proof: Instances of
(ψ → ϕ)→ (γ → ψ)→ (γ → ϕ) (13)
have short IPC→-F proofs by Lemma 2.1. By chaining |Γ| of them, we can construct short
proofs of
(ψ → ϕ)→ (Γ→ ψ)→ (Γ→ ϕ). (14)
(This is in fact the special case of (ii) with n = 1.)
(i): It is easy to see that we can derive each such formula as a composition of polynomially
many instances of weakening, exchange, and contraction:
(Γ→ Π→ ϕ)→ (Γ→ α→ Π→ ϕ), (15)
(Γ→ α→ β → Π→ ϕ)→ (Γ→ β → α→ Π→ ϕ), (16)
(Γ→ α→ α→ Π→ ϕ)→ (Γ→ α→ Π→ ϕ), (17)
it thus suffices to prove (15)–(17). By replacing ϕ with Π → ϕ, we can assume Π = ∅;
using (14), we can also assume Γ = ∅. Then (15)–(17) are instances of constant-size IPC→
tautologies, hence they have short IPC→-F proofs by Lemma 2.1.
(ii): By induction on n. For n = 0, (ii) reduces to ϕ→ Γ→ ϕ, which is an instance of (i).
For the induction step, let ∆ = 〈ψ0, . . . , ψn〉, and put ∆
′ = 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉, and
ξ = (Γ→ ψ1)→ · · · → (Γ→ ψn)→ Γ→ ϕ.
By the induction hypothesis, we have an IPC→-F proof of
(∆′ → ϕ)→ ξ.
Using (13), we infer
(ψ0 → ∆
′ → ϕ)→ (ψ0 → ξ),
and using (14), we obtain
(ψ0 → ∆
′ → ϕ)→ (Γ→ ψ0)→ Γ→ ξ,
that is,
(∆→ ϕ)→ (Γ→ ψ0)→ Γ→ (Γ→ ψ1)→ · · · → (Γ→ ψn)→ Γ→ ϕ.
We conclude
(∆→ ϕ)→ (Γ→ ψ0)→ (Γ→ ψ1)→ · · · → (Γ→ ψn)→ Γ→ ϕ
using (i). 
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As a consequence of (i), we can extend the notation Γ→ ϕ to sets Γ instead of sequences, as
the ordering of the formulas does not make a significant difference. A particular special case
of (ii) is when ⊢ ∆→ ϕ; for example, we can construct in poly-time IPC→-F proofs of
(Γ→ ϕ)→ (Γ→ ϕ→ ψ)→ Γ→ ψ.
Until the end of this section, let L be an si logic, and C ⊆ CIPC a set of connectives such
that → ∈ C. Armed with Lemma 2.3, we can prove the feasible deduction theorem (cf. [12,
Prop. 3.6]) using the standard argument by induction on the length of the derivation:
Proposition 2.4 Let P denote LC-F , LC-CF, or LC-EF. Given a P -derivation of a for-
mula ϕ from a set Γ, we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof of Γ→ ϕ. 
Now we turn to the relations between our proof systems. First, L-CF and L-EF are
more-or-less just different presentations of the same system; moreover, the size of L-EF or
L-CF proofs is (up to a polynomial) essentially the same measure as the number of lines in
L-F proofs. These properties are well known for L = CPC, and noted to hold for si logics
in [12, Prop. 3.2–3]; we observe that the argument applies to fragments LC just the same. In
order to state it properly, let sP (ϕ) denote the minimal size of a P -proof of a formula ϕ, and
kP (ϕ) the minimal number of lines in a P -proof of ϕ (for proof systems P where the concept
of lines makes sense).
Proposition 2.5 LC-EF and LC-CF are p-equivalent. Moreover, for any LC-tautology ϕ,
we have
kLC -EF (ϕ) ≤ kLC -F (ϕ) = kLC -CF (ϕ) = O(kLC -EF (ϕ)),
and
sLC-EF (ϕ) = O(kLC -F (ϕ) + |ϕ|
2). 
The next result is again well known for CPC, and noted to hold for si logics in [12,
Prop. 3.11]. Even with Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.4 at hand, it is not immediately obvious
that it also applies to fragments, since the standard argument from [14, L. 4.4.8] relies on a
tree of conjunctions. We can make it work with the help of the following trick: in intuitionistic
logic, propositions expressed by formulas of the form Γ → α for a fixed α form a Boolean
algebra, with the induced → operation, and α serving the role of ⊥; cf. (22). In particular,
they carry a well-behaved conjunction operation
(Γ→ α) ∧α (∆→ α) =
(
(Γ→ α)→ (∆→ α)→ α
)
→ α.
This can be employed to emulate the original Kraj´ıcˇek’s argument. We leave the details to
the reader.
Proposition 2.6 Let P be LC-F , LC-EF, or LC-CF. Given a P -proof of a formula ϕ with
m lines, we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof of ϕ of height O(logm). Consequently,
P ≡p P
∗. 
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Another consequence of Proposition 2.6 is that all tree-like Frege (EF , CF , resp.) systems
for LC are equivalent. This is no longer true for tree-like SF systems: as explained in [12,
§3.1], LC-SF
∗ systems are sensitive to the choice of basic rules4. For simplicity, we state the
next result for standard axiom systems, but it holds more generally under the assumption
that (1) has a tree-like Frege derivation in which the premise α is used only once. Then, using
Lemma 2.3 and Propositions 2.4 and 2.6, we can generalize [12, Thm. 3.12] to fragments as
follows:
Proposition 2.7 A standard LC-SF
∗ system is p-equivalent to LC-EF . 
This leaves us with only three potentially different proof systems for LC out of those
mentioned above (ignoring non-standard LC-SF
∗ systems): LC-F ≤p LC-EF ≤p LC-SF .
Whether CPC-EF has superpolynomial speed-up over CPC-F is a notorious open problem,
and it is unresolved for IPC or other si logics or their fragments as well. Whether EF and SF
are equivalent depends on the logic: in particular, CPC-EF ≡p CPC-SF , whereas IPC-SF
has exponential speed-up over IPC-EF . These questions are extensively studied in [12], while
generalization of the speed-up to fragments is one of the goals of the present paper, so we will
get back to it later.
3 Elimination of connectives from tautologies
As already mentioned in the introduction, motivation for this section comes from lower bounds
on intuitionistic proofs:
Theorem 3.1 (Hrubesˇ [9]) There is a sequence {ϕn : n ∈ ω} of intuitionistic tautologies
of the form ∧
i<m
(pi ∨ p
′
i)→ ¬α(~p,~s) ∨ ¬β(
~p′, ~r), (18)
constructible in time nO(1), that require IPC-EF proofs of size 2n
Ω(1)
. 
The original clique–colouring tautologies can be modified to yield the following strengthening:
Theorem 3.2 (Jerˇa´bek [12]) There is a sequence {ϕn : n ∈ ω} of intuitionistic tautologies
of the form∧
i<m
(pi ∨ p
′
i)→
( ∧
j<m
(sj ∨ s
′
j)→ γ(~p,~s,
~s′)
)
∨
( ∧
k<m
(rk ∨ r
′
k)→ δ(
~p′, ~r, ~r′)
)
, (19)
with γ, δ strict monotone, that have IPC-SF proofs constructible in time nO(1), but require
L-EF proofs of size 2n
Ω(1)
for any si logic L of unbounded branching. 
(L has bounded branching if, roughly, there is a finite constant b such that any point in a
finite L-frame has at most b immediate successors. See [12] for details.)
4Thus, the LC -SF
∗ notation is misleading. We should properly indicate the set of Frege rules.
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We would like to modify these tautologies further to make them purely implicational while
preserving the bounds on the lengths of their proofs. Rather than dwelling on these specific
examples, we would like to have a method applicable more generally to arbitrary tautologies;
the ideal result could look as follows:
False theorem 3.3 Given a formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time an implicational
formula ϕ′ with the following property. If P denotes L-F , L-EF, or L-SF for a si logic L,
then P -proofs of ϕ and ϕ′ can be constructed from each other in polynomial time.
As we will discuss in more detail below, this is too good to be true: we need to restrict
the class of tautologies or the class of logics. Nevertheless, we will seek results in a similar
spirit.
We start with a construction that applies to all si logic in a very uniform way, but does
not in general produce fully implicational tautologies from arbitrary formulas ϕ. The idea
is very simple: we introduce extension variables for subformulas of ϕ. This cuts the meat
of ϕ into small chunks (extension axioms), most of which can be rewritten with implicational
formulas. (We stress that extension variables can be used in this way even in Frege. The
point is that here the set of extension axioms is a priori polynomially bounded and we can
incorporate them in the tautology, whereas an L-EF proof may potentially use an unlimited
number of extension axioms that cannot be simulated in this way.)
We recall the usual notion of positive and negative occurrences of subformulas of ϕ: the
occurrence of ϕ in itself is positive, polarity is flipped when passing to the antecedent of an
implication, and it is preserved by other connectives.
Proposition 3.4 Given a formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a formula ϕ of
the form
(p0 → ⊥)→ (p1 → q1 ∨ r1)→ · · · → (pm → qm ∨ rm)→ ϕ→,
where ϕ→ is purely implicational, m is the number of disjunctions with negative occurrences
in ϕ, and the p0 → ⊥ term is omitted if ϕ has no negative occurrences of ⊥, with the following
properties.
(i) There are a poly-time constructible substitution σ, and a poly-time constructible IPC-F
proof of σ(ϕ)→ ϕ.
(ii) There is a poly-time constructible IPC-F proof of ϕ→ ϕ.
In particular, if L is a si logic, and P is L-F , L-EF, or L-SF, then P -proofs of ϕ and ϕ are
poly-time constructible from each other.
Proof: We introduce a variable pψ for each subformula ψ ⊆ ϕ, where the original variables
pi are identified with ppi . We define a set of formulas Ξ, consisting of the following formulas
for each nonvariable ψ ⊆ ϕ, depending on whether ψ occurs positively or negatively in ϕ:
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ψ positive negative
⊥ pψ → ⊥
ψ0 → ψ1 (pψ0 → pψ1)→ pψ pψ → pψ0 → pψ1
ψ0 ∧ ψ1 pψ0 → pψ1 → pψ pψ → pψ0
pψ → pψ1
ψ0 ∨ ψ1 pψ0 → pψ pψ → pψ0 ∨ pψ1
pψ1 → pψ
Enumerate Ξ = {ξ0, . . . , ξr} so that the formulas involving ⊥ or ∨ come first, and define ϕ as
ξ0 → · · · → ξr → pϕ.
(i): Put σ(pψ) = ψ. Then the formulas from σ(Ξ) are instances of constant-size tau-
tologies, hence they have linear-size proofs, using which it is easy to construct a proof of
σ(ϕ)→ σ(pϕ).
(ii): Let π consist of Ξ followed by formulas
ψ → pψ (20)
for positively occurring ψ ⊆ ϕ, and
pψ → ψ (21)
for negatively occurring ψ ⊆ ϕ, ordered bottom-up. We can easily complete π to a valid
derivation of ϕ → pϕ from assumptions Ξ: for example, let ψ = ψ0 → ψ1 have positive
occurrence in ϕ. Then ψ → pψ has linear-size derivation from the formulas
(pψ0 → pψ1)→ pψ
pψ0 → ψ0
ψ1 → pψ1
that appear earlier in π.
Using the feasible deduction theorem (and possibly Lemma 2.3 to reorder the formulas),
we can turn π into a proof of ϕ→ Ξ→ pϕ, which is ϕ→ ϕ. 
This is not yet the end of the story. Let us see where Proposition 3.4 gets us with respect
to the original goal. We did not eliminate ⊥ embedded in α, β in (18), but this is not a
problem, as a ⊥-free version of these tautologies is already provided by (19). Elimination
of ∨ is more interesting. Most crucially, the main disjunctions on the right-hand sides of
(18), (19) occur positively, and therefore are eliminated by Proposition 3.4. The same applies
to ∨ embedded in γ, δ of (19). There might be some disjunctions coming from α, β left
in (18), however we can ignore these as we can apply classical reasoning inside negations.
The remaining disjunctions in (18) and (19) occur in the context
∧
i(pi ∨ p
′
i) → · · · , and we
will get rid of them by exploiting the intuitionistic equivalences
(ϕ ∨ ψ → χ)↔ (ϕ→ χ) ∧ (ψ → χ),
(ϕ ∧ ψ → χ)↔ (ϕ→ ψ → χ),
(ϕ→ χ)↔ (((ϕ→ χ)→ χ)→ χ).

 (22)
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We now formalize these considerations.
Definition 3.5 An occurrence of ψ ∨ χ in a formula ϕ is inessential if
(i) it is positive, or
(ii) it is in the scope of a negation (i.e., inside a subformula of ϕ of the form α→ ⊥), or
(iii) there is an implication α→ β ⊆ ϕ such that the given occurrence of ψ ∨ χ is inside α,
and not inside any subformula of α that is an implication. In other words, the only
connectives on the path from ψ ∨ χ to α in the formula tree are ∨ and ∧.
All other occurrences of disjunctions in ϕ are essential.
Theorem 3.6 Proposition 3.4 holds with m being the number of essential occurrences of
disjunctions in ϕ.
Proof: For any subformula α→ ⊥ of ϕ, we may replace α with a canonically chosen classically
equivalent formula using →,⊥ as the only connectives, hence we may assume without loss of
generality that no disjunctions occur inside negations.
We modify the construction from the proof of Proposition 3.4 as follows. Consider any
positively occurring implication γ ⊆ ϕ, and write it as
µ(α0, . . . , αr−1)→ β,
where µ(x0, . . . , xr−1) is a strict monotone formula, and each αi is a variable, a constant, or
an implication. We omit the variables pν(~α) for non-variable subformulas ν ⊆ µ along with the
associated formulas in Ξ, and introduce instead variables qγν for ν ⊆ µ with intended meaning
ν(~α)→ β, where qγµ is identified with pγ . We will write just qν to simplify the notation.
We include in Ξ the following formulas for each ν ⊆ µ:
ν formula in Ξ
xi (pαi → pβ)→ qν
ν ′ ∨ ν ′′ ((qν′ → qν′′ → pβ)→ pβ)→ qν
ν ′ ∧ ν ′′ ((qν′ → pβ)→ qν′′)→ qν
(i): We extend σ by putting σ(qν) = (ν(~α)→ β). As in the proof of Proposition 3.4, it is
enough to construct short IPC-F proofs of the new formulas in σ(Ξ). This is straightforward:
(ν ′(~α) ∨ ν ′′(~α)→ β)↔ (((ν ′(~α) ∨ ν ′′(~α)→ β)→ β)→ β)
↔ (((ν ′(~α)→ β) ∧ (ν ′′(~α)→ β)→ β)→ β)
↔ (((ν ′(~α)→ β)→ (ν ′′(~α)→ β)→ β)→ β)
using (22); likewise,
(ν ′(~α) ∧ ν ′′(~α)→ β)↔ (ν ′′(~α)→ ν ′(~α)→ β)
↔ (ν ′′(~α)→ ((ν ′(~α)→ β)→ β)→ β)
↔ (((ν ′(~α)→ β)→ β)→ ν ′′(~α)→ β).
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(ii): We modify the proof π considered in Proposition 3.4 by including the formulas
(ν(~α)→ β)→ qν (23)
for all ν ⊆ µ. Notice that the final formula (23) for ν = µ is just (20) for ψ = γ. We complete
π to a valid derivation as in the proof of Proposition 3.4; we only need to take care of the
new formulas (23).
If ν = ν ′ ∨ ν ′′, we can derive
(ν(~α)→ β)→ (ν ′(~α) ∨ ν ′′(~α)→ pβ) (20) for β
→ (((ν ′(~α)→ pβ)→ (ν
′′(~α)→ pβ)→ pβ)→ pβ) (22)
→ ((qν′ → qν′′ → pβ)→ pβ) (23) for ν
′, ν ′′
→ qν , Ξ
using the fact that qν′ and qν′′ occur positively in (qν′ → qν′′ → pβ)→ pβ.
The other cases are analogous. 
Corollary 3.7 There are implicational formulas {ϕn : n ∈ ω} satisfying Theorem 3.2.
Proof: No essential disjunctions occur in (19). 
(See Theorem 4.22 for a further improvement of Corollary 3.7.)
As we will see, we can strengthen Proposition 3.4 for intuitionistic logic so that the
resulting formula is always purely implicational, irrespective of what kind of disjunctions
occur in ϕ. However, this will require a construction of a different kind that no longer applies
to arbitrary si logics L. The reason is that the properties of ϕ as given by Proposition 3.4
imply that ϕ is interderivable with ϕ in the sense that IPC+ϕ = IPC+ϕ. If we can always
find a positive (i.e., ⊥-free) ϕ with this property for every L-tautology ϕ, then L is positively
axiomatizable over IPC, or equivalently, the class of general L-frames is closed under dense
subframes. For instance, this fails for L = KC, which has the same positive fragment as IPC.
Similarly, if we can always find a ∨-free ϕ, then L is a cofinal-subframe logic.
This problem comes up even if we do not ask ϕ to have the strong properties guaranteed
by Proposition 3.4, but merely that it is positive, and preserves proof length in a particular
logic L up to a polynomial. If L ⊆KC, we know from [12, L. 6.30] that L-EF is polynomially
equivalent to IPC-EF with respect to positive tautologies. Thus, the existence of such a map
ϕ 7→ ϕ would imply that L-EF has essentially the same proof complexity as IPC-EF , and
in particular, that every L-tautology has a proof of at most exponential size. However, there
are a vast number of logics between IPC and KC, many of which are outside NEXP, or even
undecidable.5
So, to make a long story short, we will only show how to eliminate ⊥ and ∨ from tautologies
in logics whose proper axioms do not contain the respective connectives, which appears to be
the best we can hope for. We start with the simpler case of ⊥. The idea here is just that the
conjunction of all variables is a good enough approximation of ⊥ vis-a`-vis positive formulas.
5The undecidable, finitely axiomatized si logics with the disjunction property (which incidentally implies
they also have the same ∨-free fragment as IPC) from [5, Ex. 15.11] are easily seen to be included in KC. As
for natural examples, the author wonders what is the complexity of the Kreisel–Putnam logic.
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Theorem 3.8 Given a formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a positive formula ϕ+
and a substitution σ with the following properties.
(i) There is a poly-time constructible IPC-F proof of σ(ϕ+)→ ϕ.
(ii) Let P denote L-F , L-EF, or L-SF for a si logic L axiomatizable by positive formulas.
Then given a P -proof of ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof of ϕ+.
Moreover, we can make ϕ+ to have the form
(p1 → q1 ∨ r1)→ · · · → (pm → qm ∨ rm)→ ϕ→, (24)
where ϕ→ is purely implicational, and m is the number of essential occurrences of ∨ in ϕ.
Proof: Write ϕ = ϕ′(p0, . . . , pn−1,⊥), where ϕ
′ is positive, and p0, . . . , pn−1 are all variables
occurring in ϕ. Define ϕ+ as
(r → p0)→ · · · → (r → pn−1)→ ϕ
′(p0, . . . , pn−1, r), (25)
where r is a new variable. (i) is straightforward, using the substitution σ(r) = ⊥.
(ii): We can assume the Frege rules of P consist of positive axioms, modus ponens, and
the axiom (10). First, let P be L-F or L-EF . Let π be a P -proof of ϕ. We may assume
that the only variables occurring in π are pi and extension variables, and that none of the
extension variables is r. We can also assume that the only instances of (10) in π are with
γ = pi: we can derive ⊥ → γ for an arbitrary γ from these by a polynomial-size subproof
by induction on the complexity of γ (using extension axioms to get ⊥ → qj for extension
variables qj).
We replace ⊥ with r in the proof. Treating the axioms r → pi as extra assumptions, we
construct a proof of ϕ+ by an application of the feasible deduction theorem.
Now, let P = L-SF , and π = ϕ1, . . . , ϕm be a P -proof of ϕm = ϕ. We may assume r does
not occur in π. We will complete ϕ+1 , . . . , ϕ
+
m to a valid P -proof, where all the formulas ϕ
+
j
use the same r, but only variables actually occurring in ϕj in the premise of (25).
L-SF has a constant finite set of axioms, whose translations have constant-size proofs,
which takes care of the case when ϕj is an axiom.
If ϕj is derived by modus ponens from ϕk and ϕl = (ϕk → ϕj), let p0, . . . , pn−1 be the
variables of ϕl. We can insert extra conjuncts in ϕ
+
k if necessary to obtain
{r → pi : i < n} → ϕ
′
k(~p, r),
{r → pi : i < n} → ϕ
′
k(~p, r)→ ϕ
′
j(~p, r),
from which we derive
{r → pi : i < n} → ϕ
′
j(~p, r)
using Lemma 2.3. We get rid of unwanted conjuncts r → pi for pi not occurring in ϕj by
substituting r for pi.
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Assume that ϕj(p0, . . . , pn−1) is derived from ϕk(q0, . . . , qm−1) by the substitution rule, so
that ϕj = ϕk(α0, . . . , αm−1) for some formulas αi(~p), i < m. (Here, ~q may well be the same
variables as ~p; we distinguish them in notation for clarity.) We are given the formula ϕ+k ,
which is
{r → ql : l < m} → ϕ
′
k(~q, r).
Applying the substitution rule to ϕ+k , we derive
{r → α′l(~p, r) : l < m} → ϕ
′
k(α
′
0(~p, r), . . . , α
′
m−1(~p, r), r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕ′j(~p,r)
.
We construct short proofs of
{r → pi : i < n} → r → α
′
l(~p, r)
for l < m by induction on the complexity of the positive formulas α′l(~p, r), and conclude
{r → pi : i < n} → ϕ
′
j(~p, r),
which is ϕ+j . This finishes the argument for P = L-SF .
Finally, notice that the construction of ϕ+ did not increase the number of essential (or
inessential, for that matter) disjunctions, hence if we use ϕ+ from Theorem 3.6 instead, it
will have the required form (24). 
Elimination of ∨ is ostensibly more complicated than elimination of ⊥, but it can be seen as
a generalization of the latter, as ⊥ is just the empty disjunction. In the proof of Theorem 3.8,
we exploited the fact that the algebra of positive formulas in finitely many variables has a
least element (and therefore is a Heyting algebra), which we can use to emulate ⊥. The least
element should be the meet of all positive formulas, but this equals the meet of just variables,
which makes it definable by a finite formula.
In order to eliminate ∨ in a similar way, Diego’s theorem [5, §5.4] ensures that the algebra
of ∨-free formulas in finitely many variables is finite; since it is a ∧-semilattice, it is in fact
a complete lattice (and a Heyting algebra). The join operation of this lattice can be used to
emulate disjunction. The join of ψ and χ should be the conjunction of all ∨-free formulas
implied by ψ ∨ χ, which are up to equivalence exactly the formulas of the form
(ψ → γ)→ (χ→ γ)→ γ.
As with ⊥, it turns out that it is enough to consider just variables (and ⊥) in place of γ,
resulting in a short conjunction.
We will need to emulate all disjunctions appearing in the proof. Since the replacement
for ψ ∨ χ involves many occurrences of ψ and χ, we need to work with circuits to preserve
polynomial size. That is, the argument will only give polynomial simulation of EF systems,
not Frege.
Theorem 3.9 Given a formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a {→,⊥}-formula ϕ˜
(purely implicational if ϕ is positive) and a substitution σ with the following properties.
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(i) There is a poly-time constructible IPC-F proof of σ(ϕ˜)→ ϕ.
(ii) Let P denote L-EF or L-SF for a cofinal-subframe si logic L. Given a P -proof of ϕ,
we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof of ϕ˜.
Proof: We will first construct a ∨-free formula ϕ˜ with these properties.
Let a formula ϕ(~p) be given. For each ψ ∨ χ ⊆ ϕ, we introduce a new variable rψ∨χ; we
denote by α∗ the result of replacing all top-most occurrences of disjunctions ψ∨χ with rψ∨χ.
We define
ϕ˜ = ∆ϕ → ϕ
∗,
where the set ∆ϕ consists of the formulas
ψ∗ → rψ∨χ, (26)
χ∗ → rψ∨χ, (27)
rψ∨χ → (ψ
∗ → v)→ (χ∗ → v)→ v (28)
for ψ ∨ χ ⊆ ϕ, and v ∈ Vϕ = {~p,~r,⊥} (where ~r stands for the list {rψ∨χ : ψ ∨ χ ⊆ ϕ}).
(i): Putting σ(rψ∨χ) = ψ ∨ χ, we have σ(α
∗) = α for each α, hence σ(ϕ˜) = σ(∆ϕ) → ϕ,
and the formulas in σ(∆ϕ) are instances of constant-size tautologies.
(ii): First, let P = L-EF . We may assume the Frege rules of P are instances of ∨-free
axioms, modus ponens, and the axioms (7)–(9). Let π be a P -proof of ϕ. We may assume the
only variables in π are ~p and extension variables. We introduce new variables rψ∨χ for each
disjunction appearing in π, and write α∗ for the result of replacing all top-most disjunctions
in α with the corresponding variables. Notice that this agrees with the definition of α∗ used
in the construction of ϕ˜.
We replace each formula α in π with α∗. At the beginning of the proof, we add the
formulas ∆ϕ as extra assumptions. We introduce the extension axiom
rψ∨χ ↔
∧
v∈Vϕ
(
(ψ∗ → v)→ (χ∗ → v)→ v
)
(29)
for each ψ ∨ χ * ϕ; we place this axiom after extension axioms for all extension variables
occurring in ψ∗, χ∗. We stress that Vϕ does not contain variables rψ∨χ for ψ ∨ χ * ϕ.
In order to make this a valid derivation, we need to fix occurrences of (7)–(9) in the proof.
As for (7) and (8), the formulas
α∗ → rα∨β , β
∗ → rα∨β
are included in ∆ϕ for α ∨ β ⊆ ϕ, and easily provable from (29) for other α ∨ β.
As for (9), notice that γ∗ is ∨-free. The formulas
rα∨β → (α
∗ → ξ)→ (β∗ → ξ)→ ξ (30)
are in ∆ϕ or derivable from (29) when ξ ∈ Vϕ. For general ∨-free ξ (using only variables
occurring in the proof), we construct a derivation of (30) by inner induction on the complexity
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of ξ, and outer induction on the extension variables (old or new) occurring in ξ. For the
induction hypothesis, if ◦ ∈ {→,∧}, then
rα∨β → (α
∗ → ξ0)→ (β
∗ → ξ0)→ ξ0,
rα∨β → (α
∗ → ξ1)→ (β
∗ → ξ1)→ ξ1 ⊢ rα∨β → (α
∗ → ξ0 ◦ ξ1)→ (β
∗ → ξ0 ◦ ξ1)→ ξ0 ◦ ξ1
is an instance of a constant-size derivation. If ξ is an extension variable, we derive (30) for
its definition by the induction hypothesis, and use the extension axiom.
In the end, we obtain a valid P -derivation of ϕ∗ from assumptions ∆ϕ, and we use the
feasible deduction theorem to get a proof of ϕ˜.
Now, let P = L-SF , and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm be a P -proof of ϕ. We consider the sequence
ϕ˜1, . . . , ϕ˜m, and make it a valid P -proof as follows.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.8, translations of axioms have constant-size proofs.
If ϕj = ϕk(α1, . . . , αn) is inferred from ϕk by substitution, we rename variables rψ∨χ in ϕ˜k
to rψ(~α)∨χ(~α), and substitute α
∗
1, . . . , α
∗
n to obtain ∆
′ → ϕ∗j , where ∆
′ contains some of the
formulas of the form
ψ∗ → rψ∨χ,
χ∗ → rψ∨χ,
rψ∨χ → (ψ
∗ → v)→ (χ∗ → v)→ v
for ψ ∨ χ ⊆ ϕj , and v ∈ {α
∗
1, . . . , α
∗
n, ~r,⊥}. Only the last are a problem; we construct their
short derivations from ∆ϕj by induction on the complexity of α
∗
i as in the proof of (30). Thus,
we obtain a proof of ∆ϕj → ϕ
∗
j , i.e., ϕ˜j .
If ϕj is derived from ϕk and ϕl = (ϕk → ϕj) by modus ponens, we insert dummy premises
in ϕ˜k to obtain ∆ϕl → ϕ
∗
k, and infer
∆ϕl → ϕ
∗
j .
We need to get rid of the unwanted conjuncts from ∆ϕl r ∆ϕj . First, assume rψ∨χ occurs
in ∆ϕl for some ψ ∨ χ * ϕj , and take ψ ∨ χ maximal such. We substitute rψ∨χ with the
formula
ξ =
∧
v∈V
(
(ψ∗ → v)→ (χ∗ → v)→ v
)
,
where V is the set of v for which (28) occurs in the formula (minus v = rψ∨χ itself, for which
the conjunct is redundant). The formulas (26)–(28) associated with rψ∨χ have short proofs
after the substitution, and we can delete them. We can also delete the formulas
rψ′∨χ′ → (ψ
′∗ → ξ)→ (χ′∗ → ξ)→ ξ
for other rψ′∨χ′ : they have short derivations from the remaining formulas, as ξ is a ∨-free
formula not containing rψ∨χ. After that, there are no traces left of either rψ∨χ or ξ.
We continue in this way to eliminate all variables rψ∨χ for ψ∨χ * ϕj . The only unwanted
things left are then formulas (28) for ψ ∨ χ ⊆ ϕj , and v = pi a variable not occurring in ϕj .
We can e.g. substitute ⊥ for pi.
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This concludes the proof of (ii), but we have so far only constructed a ∨-free formula ϕ˜
with the required properties. In order to make it a {→,⊥}-formula, it suffices to apply
Proposition 3.4. However, we need to be a bit more careful if we want an implicational
formula in case ϕ is positive, as the definition of ϕ˜ unconditionally introduced ⊥.
Fortunately, if ϕ is positive, the formulas (28) with v = ⊥ are redundant in ∆ϕ: the
remaining formulas imply
rψ∨χ → (ψ
∗ → ⊥)→ (χ∗ → ⊥)→ v, v ∈ {~p,~r}.
Since χ∗ is positive, this yields
rψ∨χ → (ψ
∗ → ⊥)→ (χ∗ → ⊥)→ χ∗,
hence
rψ∨χ → (ψ
∗ → ⊥)→ (χ∗ → ⊥)→ ⊥
as needed. 
For IPC, and more generally logics axiomatizable by both ⊥-free and ∨-free formulas
(i.e., subframe logics), we can apply Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 in a row:
Corollary 3.10 Given a formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a purely implica-
tional formula ϕˆ and a substitution σ with the following properties.
(i) There is a poly-time constructible IPC-F proof of σ(ϕˆ)→ ϕ.
(ii) Let P denote L-EF or L-SF for a subframe si logic L. Given a P -proof of ϕ, we can
construct in polynomial time a P -proof of ϕˆ. 
4 Elimination of connectives from proofs
So far we were concerned with elimination of connectives from the formula to be proved, but
we still allowed proofs to be carried out in the full logic. It is natural to ask if we can also
eliminate connectives other than implication from the proofs themselves, and indeed some
of the arguments we used earlier can help with that goal, too. The ideal result could be
formulated as
False theorem 4.1 Let P denote L-F , L-EF , or L-SF for a si logic L, and → ∈ C ⊆ CIPC.
Given a P -proof of a C-formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof of ϕ
consisting only of C-formulas.
In this formulation, the result is extremely sensitive to the choice of axioms of L: to begin
with, there is no way it could hold if we axiomatize L so that none of the axioms is a C-formula.
Thus, we can only get results of this form for very particular axiom systems.
We could avoid this dependence on axiomatization by shifting perspective: we can view it
as a feasible conservativity result, i.e., a form of p-simulation between two different systems.
For example, here is such a statement for EF :
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False theorem 4.2 Let L be a si logic, and → ∈ C ⊆ CIPC. Given an L-EF proof of a
C-formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time an LC-EF proof of ϕ. That is, LC-EF
p-simulates L-EF with respect to C-formulas.
Nevertheless, we start with a result in the form of 4.1; in fact, we formulate it in a stronger
way, which gives us control over unwanted connectives even if they appear in the tautology
being proved. In a pleasant turn of events, we have no real work to do: we just reap what we
have grown in the proofs of Theorems 3.8 and 3.9.
For simplicity, we state the result only for extended Frege. The less interesting part (ii)
also works for Frege. The statement also holds for substitution Frege after appropriate modifi-
cations (SF proofs only include the basic form of each axiom once, and if needed, its instances
can be derived by means of the substitution rule, thus the restrictions on instances below are
not meaningful).
Theorem 4.3 Let L be a si logic, and P a standard L-EF system. Given a P -proof π of a
formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof π′ of ϕ with the following properties:
(i) If the proper axiom of P is ∨-free, then the only disjunctions occurring in π′ are sub-
formulas of ϕ, and the only instances of (9) in π′ are with γ a subformula of ϕ which
is a variable, a disjunction, or ⊥.
(ii) If ϕ and the proper axiom of P are positive, then ⊥ does not occur in π′. Otherwise the
only instances of (10) in π′ are with γ a variable from ϕ.
Proof: (i): Let ϕ˜ be the ∨-free (and ⊥-free, if ϕ is) formula from Theorem 3.9, and π˜ its
P -proof constructed there. There are no disjunctions in π˜. We apply to π˜ the substitution
σ(rψ∨χ) = ψ ∨ χ. Then the only disjunctions in σ(π˜) are subformulas of ϕ, and the proof
does not use axioms (7)–(9). The conclusion of the proof is σ(∆ϕ)→ ϕ, and the formulas in
σ(∆ϕ) are instances of (7)–(9) of the required form, hence we can include them in the proof,
and infer ϕ by modus ponens.
The argument for (ii) is analogous: we take the ⊥-free proof of the formula ϕ+ constructed
in Theorem 3.8. If ϕ contains ⊥, we substitute ⊥ for r, and eliminate the premises ⊥ → pi
by introducing them as axioms. If ϕ is positive, we substitute
∧
i pi for r instead. This
construction does not introduce any new disjunctions or instances of (9), hence if the axioms
of L are ⊥-free and ∨-free, we can satisfy (i) and (ii) simultaneously. 
Theorem 4.3 quite satisfactorily eliminates ∨ and ⊥. Unfortunately, not only it does not
eliminate ∧, the argument may even introduce new conjunctions into the proof (cf. (29)). We
will spend the rest of this section by trying to remedy this defect in several ways.
Let us first note that while every si logic can be axiomatized without the use of ∧ by
Lemma 2.2, we cannot simply extend Theorem 4.3 by adding a conjunction clause analogous
to (i). Let α be an implicational axiom. Completely disregarding lengths of proofs, Theo-
rem 4.3 implies that the ∨-free fragment of the logic L = IPC + α can be axiomatized by α
over the ∨-free fragment of IPC, and similarly for ⊥. As shown in Proposition A.5, similar
statements are not true in the absence of ∧: for example, it may happen that IPC→ + α
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is strictly weaker than L→. This does not mean that elimination of connectives from proofs
besides the cases in Theorem 4.3 is impossible, but it cannot work so uniformly; we will need
to impose extra requirements on the logics involved, and on their axiom sets.
We include the following particular results. Section 4.1 contains an alternative simple
transformation for elimination of⊥ that does not rely on the presence of other connectives such
as ∧, and works even for Frege, but needs peculiar assumptions on the logic. In Section 4.2
we present a method for elimination of ∧ from ∨-free proofs for axiom systems that avoid
the obstacle from Proposition A.5. To tie a loose end, we give an ad hoc argument that the
implicational tautologies from Corollary 3.7 have short IPC→-SF proofs in Section 4.3.
4.1 Light-weight elimination of ⊥
We are going to present a method for elimination of ⊥ from intuitionistic proofs. It is
less invasive than the one from Theorem 4.3, and in particular, it avoids introducing ∧ (or
other connectives, for that matter) into the proof. The translation also applies to other
logics, under a certain semantic condition: the class of frames for the logic must be preserved
under attachment of a new top element. (Thus, it does not fully supersede Theorem 4.3 (ii).)
Interestingly, unlike other simulations in this paper, this one can even be usefully employed to
translate proofs from one logic into another; in fact, its variant was introduced in [12, L. 6.30]
for that very purpose. Another presentation of this translation, as well as the associated
semantic construction in Definition 4.4, was later given by De Jongh and Zhao [13].
Definition 4.4 If F = 〈F,≤〉 is a Kripke frame, let F t = 〈F t,≤t〉 denote the frame obtained
from F by attaching a new top element t; that is, F t = F ∪{t}, and ≤t = ≤∪ (F t×{t}). We
can also apply the construction to general frames F = 〈F,≤, A〉: we define F t = 〈F t,≤t, At〉
with the same F t and ≤t as before, and At = {∅} ∪
{
X ∪ {t} : X ∈ A
}
.
Theorem 4.5 Given an IPC-F proof π of a positive formula ϕ, we can construct in poly-
nomial time an IPC-F proof of ϕ containing no ⊥, and only those positive connectives that
already occur in π.
More generally, assume that L1 is a si logic complete wrt a class of frames K, and L0 is
a si logic which is valid in F t for all F ∈ K. Let C ⊆ {→,∧,∨}. Given an L0C,⊥-F proof of
a C-formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time an L1C-F proof of ϕ.
The same results hold with EF in place of Frege.
Proof: Let v be the classical assignment that makes all variables true. For every C ∪ {⊥}-
formula ϕ such that v(ϕ) = 1, we define6 a C-formula ϕ∗ by induction on the complexity
6We leave ϕ∗ undefined when v(ϕ) = 0. If we needed it for other purposes, the semantically correct way to
define it would be ϕ∗ = ⊥, which is however not a positive formula.
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of ϕ:
p∗ = p,
(ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗,
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗ =


ϕ∗ ∨ ψ∗, v(ϕ) = v(ψ) = 1,
ϕ∗, v(ψ) = 0,
ψ∗, v(ϕ) = 0,
(ϕ→ ψ)∗ =
{
ϕ∗ → ψ∗, v(ϕ) = v(ψ) = 1,
⊤, v(ϕ) = 0.
Notice that if ϕ contains no ⊥, then v satisfies all its subformulas, hence ϕ∗ = ϕ.
If L1 is inconsistent, every C-formula has a linear-size L1C-F proof. Thus, we can assume
L1 is consistent, in which case so is L0 (as K 6= ∅), hence L0 ⊆ CPC.
Let π = 〈ϕ0, . . . , ϕm〉 be an L
0
C,⊥-F proof of a C-formula ϕm. By our assumption, all
ϕi are classical tautologies, in particular v(ϕi) = 1, hence we can construct the sequence
π∗ = 〈ϕ∗0, . . . , ϕ
∗
m〉. Clearly, π
∗ consists of C-formulas, and ends with ϕ∗m = ϕm. We need to
show that it can be completed to a polynomially larger L1C-F proof.
Claim 1 For any L0-tautology ϕ, the formula ϕ∗ is an L1-tautology.
Proof: It suffices to show that if F ∈ K and  is an admissible valuation in F , then F  ϕ∗.
Let t be the valuation in F t which agrees with  on variables in points of F , and makes all
variables true in the new top point t. It is easy to show by induction on the complexity of a
formula α that
F t, t  α iff v(α) = 1,
F t, x  α iff v(α) = 1 and F , x  α∗
for x ∈ F . Since F t is an L0-frame, it follows that F , x  ϕ∗ for all x ∈ F .  (Claim 1)
Claim 1 shows that instances of axioms in π translate to L1C-derivable formulas, and this
could be easily generalized to rules (in particular, modus ponens). However, we also need to
establish these translations have polynomial-size proofs. We cannot directly apply Lemma 2.1:
our translation does not commute with substitution, thus instances of a fixed axiom do not
translate to substitution instances of a single tautology. The claim below shows the next best
thing: they are instances of finitely many tautologies, and this also applies to proper rules.
Claim 2 Let
̺ =
α0(p0, . . . , pk−1), . . . , αl−1(p0, . . . , pk−1)
β(p0, . . . , pk−1)
be a Frege rule of L0C,⊥-F . There is a set of K ≤ 2
k rules {̺j : j < K} derivable in L
1
C such
that for any substitution instance σ(̺) whose premises are L0-tautologies, the rule (σ(̺))∗ is
a substitution instance of some ̺j.
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Proof: Let us consider substitution instances of formulas in variables pi, i < k. It is clear
from the definition that if we fix the k values v(σ(pi)) ∈ {0, 1}, this determines v(σ(α)) for
every formula α(p0, . . . , pk−1). Moreover, in case this makes v(σ(α)) = 1, the formula (σ(α))
∗
is a substitution instance of a fixed formula: it can be shown by induction on the complexity
of α that (σ(α))∗ = σ∗((τI(α))
∗), where τI(pi) = ⊥ for i ∈ I = {i < k : v(σ(pi)) = 0}, and
σ∗(pi) = (σ(pi))
∗ for each i /∈ I.
Thus, let K be the number of assignments to the variables {pi : i < k} that satisfy
α0, . . . , αl−1, and {ej : j < K} be an enumeration of such assignments. Put Ij = {i < k :
ej(pi) = 0}, and
̺j =
(τIj (α0))
∗, . . . , (τIj (αl−1))
∗
(τIj (β))
∗
.
Since v(τIj (αi)) = ej(αi) = 1, and
⊢L1
(
τIj(α0) ∧ · · · ∧ τIj(αl−1)→ τIj(β)
)∗
by Claim 1, we have
⊢L1 (τIj(α0))
∗ ∧ · · · ∧ (τIj (αl−1))→ (τIj (β))
∗,
i.e., the rule ̺j is valid in L
1. On the other hand, assume that σ is a substitution such that
L0 proves σ(α0), . . . , σ(αl−1). Let ej be the assignment defined by ej(pi) = v(σ(pi)). Then
the discussion above shows that (σ(̺))∗ = σ∗(̺j).  (Claim 2)
Resuming the proof of Theorem 4.5, Claim 2 shows that all inference steps in π∗ are instances
of a fixed finite set of L1C-F -derivable rules, and as such they can be implemented with linear-
size L1C-F -derivations using Lemma 2.1, resulting in a polynomial-size L
1
C-F proof of the
original formula ϕm.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.5 for Frege systems. The argument for EF is
similar. If we formulate it as circuit Frege, we can use literally the same proof as above. In
the original formulation with extension axioms, we define v so that it satisfies all original
variables and all extension axioms; the definition of ϕ∗ stays unchanged, so that if q is an
extension variable with v(q) = 1, we put q∗ = q. In effect, an extension axiom q ↔ α from π
disappears in π∗ if v(α) = 0, and transforms into an extension axiom q ↔ α∗ if v(α) = 1.
The rest of the argument works the same as for Frege. 
Example 4.6 The conditions of Theorem 4.5 hold for the pair of logics L0 = KC, L1 = IPC,
or for L0 = L1 = LC.
4.2 Elimination of ∧
In this section, we explore to what extent we can eliminate conjunctions from proofs by
means of the following simple idea: by Lemma 2.2, we can rewrite any formula in a proof as
a conjunction of ∧-free formulas, and then we can replace it by the sequence of its conjuncts.
There are two principal difficulties with this method:
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(i) The construction in Lemma 2.2 substantially changes the shape and structure of the
formula. In particular, it does not commute with substitution: if we fix an axiom Φ,
then ∧-free translations of substitution instances of Φ are not themselves substitution
instances of a single formula (or a small finite set). This is responsible for the phe-
nomenon in Proposition A.5, but even if we make sure that Φ does properly axiomatize
the relevant ∧-free fragment, it means that there is no a priori reason why translation
of instances of Φ should have poly-size proofs, and we will invest a lot of effort to fix
this. It also means that the construction will not work at all for SF systems.
(ii) On the face of it, Lemma 2.2 exponentially blows up the sizes of formulas, hence it is
no good for polynomial simulations.
Concerning (ii): first, Proposition B.1 exhibits a simple {∧,∨}-formula that requires expo-
nentially many distinct conjuncts when written as a conjunction of ∧-free formulas. Thus,
the method does not stand a chance in the presence of ∨, and we will only work with ∨-free
proofs. (In fact, we will mostly work in the {→,∧}-fragment, and indicate at the end how to
extend the simulation to the {→,∧,⊥}-fragment.) In particular, our result will only apply
to cofinal subframe (i.e., {→,⊥}-axiomatized) logics.
Second, Corollary B.10 shows that an {→,∧}-formula may still require an exponential
blow-up when written as a formula with conjunctions only at top. Thus, even in this restricted
case, our only hope for a polynomial simulation is to work with circuits. In particular, the
method will only apply to EF , not Frege. These constraints put us on the right track:
Lemma 4.7 Given an {→,∧}-circuit C in variables {pi : i < n}, we can construct in poly-
nomial time a sequence of {→}-circuits {Cpi : i < n} such that
⊢IPC C ↔
∧
i<n
Cpi,
and each Cpi has the form Γ→ pi, i.e., H(C
pi) = pi.
Proof: We construct the circuits Dpi for each i < n and each circuit D represented by a node
of C by the following induction on depth.
If D = pj is a variable, we may put D
pj = pj, and D
pi = pi → pi for i 6= j.
If D = D0 → D1, we can use the equivalence
⊢IPC D ↔
(∧
i<n
Dpi0 →
∧
i<n
Dpi1
)
↔
∧
i<n
(Dp00 → · · · → D
pn−1
0 → D
pi
1 ).
If D = D0 ∧D1, we have
⊢IPC D ↔
(∧
i<n
Dpi0 ∧
∧
i<n
Dpi1
)
↔
∧
i<n
(Dpi0 ∧D
pi
1 ).
Since Dpi0 and D
pi
1 are of the form Γ→ pi, this means
⊢IPC D ↔
∧
i<n
(
(Dpi0 → D
pi
1 → pi)→ pi
)
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using (22).
It is readily seen that we added at most O(n2) new gates for each node of C, hence the
total size of
∧
iC
pi is O(n2|C|), and it can be computed by a polynomial-time algorithm. 
Lemma 4.8 If C is an implicational circuit with head H(C) = ph, there are polynomial-time
constructible IPC→-CF proofs of the circuits
Cph → C, C → Cph , Cpi
for i 6= h.
Proof: By straightforward induction on the construction of the circuit, using Lemma 2.3.
For the induction step, let C = C0 → C1, in which case
Cpi = Cp00 → · · · → C
pn−1
0 → C
pi
1 .
By the induction hypothesis, we have constructed proofs of all but one of the circuits C
pj
0 ,
and of the equivalence of the remaining one with C0. Using Lemma 2.3, we can thus construct
proofs of
Cpi ⇄ (C0 → C
pi
1 ).
For i 6= h, we also have a proof of Cpi1 , from which we derive C
pi. For i = h, we have proofs
of Cph1 ⇄ C1, using which we derive C
ph ⇄ (C0 → C1). 
On the level of proofs, we first show that the translation works in the base case of intu-
itionistic logic, where we need not worry about translations of unforeseen axioms.
Proposition 4.9 Given an IPC-EF proof of an implicational formula ϕ, we can construct
in polynomial time an IPC→-EF proof of ϕ.
Proof: It will be more convenient to work with the equivalent standard IPC-CF system.
By Theorem 4.3, we may assume the proof only employs the connectives →,∧. Thus, let
C0, . . . , Cm be an IPC→,∧-CF proof of ϕ = Cm in the axiom system given by (1)–(6). Using
the transformation from Lemma 4.7, we construct the sequence of implicational circuits
Cp00 , . . . , C
pn−1
0 , C
p0
1 , . . . , C
p0
m , . . . , C
pn−1
m ,
and we complete it to an IPC→-CF proof as follows.
If Ci is inferred from Ck = Cl → Ci and Cl by modus ponens, C
pj
k is
Cp0l → · · · → C
pn−1
l → C
pj
i .
Thus, we can infer C
pj
i from C
pj
k and C
p0
l , . . . , C
pn−1
l by n applications of modus ponens.
If Ci is an instance of axiom (2), C
pj
i is of the form Γ→ γ
pj , where Γ is the set of formulas{
αpk , αp0 → · · · → αpn−1 → βpk , αp0 → · · · → αpn−1 → βp0 → · · · → βpn−1 → γpk : k < n
}
in an appropriate order. Using Lemma 2.3, we can derive
Γ→ βpk
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for each k < n, and then we derive Γ→ γpj as required.
If Ci is an instance of axiom (4), C
pj
i is of the form(
(αp0 → βp0 → p0)→ p0
)
→ · · · →
(
(αpn−1 → βpn−1 → pn−1)→ pn−1
)
→ αpj .
Using Lemma 2.3, this follows from(
(αpj → βpj → pj)→ pj
)
→ αpj ,
which is an instance of the implicational tautology(
((x→ z)→ y → z)→ z
)
→ x→ z
as αpj is of the form · · · → pj . Axioms (3), (5), and (6) are treated similarly.
By Lemma 4.8, we can complete the proof by inferring ϕ from the circuit Cphm . 
Now we would like to generalize Proposition 4.9 to other si logics L axiomatized by
implicational formulas. Since our systems are necessarily finitely axiomatized, we may assume
L = IPC + Φ, where Φ is an implicational formula. In view of Proposition A.5, we need to
recognize when IPC→+Φ = (IPC+Φ)→, as otherwise we do not stand a chance of eliminating
∧ from (IPC+Φ)-proofs at all, never mind the length.
Definition 4.10 For any n ≥ 1, let ξn denote the substitution
ξn(pi) =
∧
j<n
pin+j.
Notice that up to associativity of ∧, ξnm = ξn ◦ ξm.
Let Φ(p0, . . . , pk−1) be an implicational formula with head H(Φ) = ph, and consider
the transformation from Lemma 4.7. As in Lemma 4.8, it is easy to see that the circuits(
ξn(Φ)
)pin+j have short IPC→-CF proofs for i 6= h, hence there are short IPC→,∧-CF proofs
of
ξn(Φ)↔
∧
j<n
(
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j . (31)
Moreover, the circuits
(
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j for j < n differ from each other only in inessential ways:
specifically, there are short IPC→-CF proofs of
σj,j′
((
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j)⇄ (ξn(Φ))phn+j′ , (32)
where σj,j′ is the substitution swapping the variables phn+j and phn+j′. In particular, proofs
of
(
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j and (ξn(Φ))phn+j′ are polynomial-time constructible from each other. In light
of this, we put
Φ∧n =
(
ξn(Φ)
)phn ,
with the understanding that the choice of j = 0 here is arbitrary.
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Lemma 4.11 If Φ is an implicational formula, the following are equivalent.
(i) (IPC+Φ)→ = IPC→ +Φ.
(ii) (IPC→,∧ +Φ)→ = IPC→ +Φ.
(iii) IPC→ +Φ proves Φ
∧n for all n ∈ ω.
(iv) IPC→ +Φ proves Φ
∧2.
Proof:
(i) ↔ (ii): We already observed that (IPC + Φ)→,∧ = IPC→,∧ + Φ as a consequence of
Theorem 4.3 (i.e., IPC is hereditarily {→,∧}-conservative over IPC→,∧ in the terminology
of Corollary A.3).
(ii) ↔ (iii): The left-to-right implication follows from (31), as ξn(Φ) is an instance of Φ
qua an axiom of IPC→,∧ +Φ.
On the other hand, assume that an implicational formula ϕ is provable in IPC→,∧ + Φ.
This means there are substitutions σu, u < r, such that IPC→,∧ proves∧
u<r
σu(Φ)→ ϕ.
Each σu(pi) is equivalent to a conjunction of implicational formulas, hence we may assume
σu(pi) =
∧
j<n
ψu,i,j
with ψu,i,j implicational, and n the same for all u and i. But then
σu(Φ) = τu(ξn(Φ)),
where τu(pin+j) = ψu,i,j. Using (31), the implicational formula
{τu
((
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j) : u < r, j < n} → ϕ
is provable in IPC, i.e., in IPC→. Using (32), each
(
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j is provable in IPC→+Φ∧n,
hence so is ϕ. By (iii), it is also provable in IPC→ +Φ.
(iii) ↔ (iv): The left-to-right implication is trivial. Assume that IPC→ + Φ proves Φ
∧2,
whence there are implicational substitutions σu, u < r, such that IPC proves∧
u<r
σu(Φ)→ Φ
∧2.
By (31) and (32), IPC also proves ∧
u<r
σu(Φ)→ ξ2(Φ). (33)
Let n ≥ 1, and apply ξn to (33). Since ξn ◦ ξ2 ≡ ξ2n, we obtain∧
u<r
ξn
(
σu(Φ)
)
→ ξ2n(Φ).
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Applying (31) to the implicational formulas σu(pi) in place of Φ, we see that each ξn(σu(pi))
is equivalent to a conjunction of n implicational formulas. Thus,
ξn ◦ σu ≡ σn,u ◦ ξn
for some implicational substitution σu,n, and IPC proves∧
u<r
σn,u
(
ξn(Φ)
)
→ ξ2n(Φ).
It follows by induction on n that there are implicational substitutions τn,u, u < rn, such
that IPC proves ∧
u<rn
τn,u(Φ)→ ξn(Φ),
hence also the implicational formula
{τn,u(Φ) : u < rn} → Φ
∧n.
Thus, IPC→ +Φ proves Φ
∧n. 
Example 4.12 Go¨del–Dummett logic LC = IPC + (p → q) ∨ (q → p) can be axiomatized
by the implicational formula
Φ =
(
(p→ q)→ r
)
→
(
(q → p)→ r
)
→ r.
Up to renaming of variables, Φ∧2 is the formula(
(p→ p′ → q)→ (p→ p′ → q′)→ r
)
→
(
(p→ p′ → q)→ (p→ p′ → q′)→ r′
)
→(
(q → q′ → p)→ (q → q′ → p′)→ r
)
→
(
(q → q′ → p)→ (q → q′ → p′)→ r′
)
→ r.
We may simplify it using the substitution r′ 7→ r, as the result(
(p→ p′ → q)→ (p→ p′ → q′)→ r
)
→
(
(q → q′ → p)→ (q → q′ → p′)→ r
)
→ r (34)
still implies the original formula. We claim that (34) is provable in IPC→+Φ, hence LC→ =
IPC→ +Φ by Lemma 4.11. This can be shown by formalizing the argument below.
The effect of Φ is that instead of proving a formula ϕ, it suffices to prove (α → β) → ϕ
and (β → α) → ϕ for a given pair of formulas α, β; in other words, we may stipulate that
α → β or β → α is given as an assumption. By repeating this argument, we see that when
proving (34) in IPC→ + Φ, we may assume that a (fixed but arbitrary) linear order on the
variables p, p′, q, q′ is given. If the order is such that min{p, p′} ≤ min{q, q′}, then p→ p′ → q
and p → p′ → q′ hold, hence the first premise of (34) indeed implies r. The other case is
symmetric. 
The argument in the proof of Lemma 4.11 shows that for any implicational axiom Φ, the
implicational fragment of the logic IPC+Φ is axiomatized by
IPC→ + {Φ
∧n : n ∈ ω}.
However, this is an infinite set of axioms, hence it is no good as a basis for a Frege system.
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Question 4.13 Let L be a si logic axiomatizable over IPC by an implicational formula (i.e.,
a finitely axiomatizable subframe si logic). Can it be axiomatized by a formula Φ satisfying
the conditions of Lemma 4.11? In other words, is L→ finitely axiomatizable?
Theorem 4.14 Let L be a si logic axiomatizable by an implicational formula satisfying the
conditions of Lemma 4.11 (in other words, a subframe si logic L such that L→ is finitely
axiomatizable).
Given an L-EF proof of an implicational formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time
an L→-EF proof of ϕ.
Proof: Write L = IPC+Φ, where the axiom Φ(p0, . . . , pk−1) is as in Lemma 4.11.
We proceed in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 4.9, using the same notation.
The only difference is that the proof being translated contains substitution instances of the
new axiom, say Ci = Φ(Ci,0, . . . , Ci,k−1). Now, in the bottom-up construction of C
pj
i , we
first construct implicational circuits C
pj
i,l such that Ci,l ≡
∧
j<nC
pj
i,l , and these are then used
as black boxes in the construction of C
pj
i ; thus, the construction proceeds as if Ci,l were a
conjunction of n new variables, which are substituted with C
pj
i,l in the end-result. The upshot
is that
C
pj
i = σ
((
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j),
where σ(pln+u) = C
pu
i,l , and H(Φ) = ph. Furthermore,
(
ξn(Φ)
)phn+j is essentially a substitu-
tion instance of Φ∧n by (32).
Thus, the only thing we need to do to complete the proof is to construct in polynomial
time L→-CF proofs of Φ
∧n, given n in unary. We will achieve this by analyzing the argument
in Lemma 4.11 (iv)→ (iii).
As in (33), let us fix r ≥ 2, implicational substitutions σu, u < r, and an IPC→,∧-F -
derivation π of ξ2(Φ) from the set of assumptions {σu(Φ) : u < r}.
We may assume n = 2t is a power of 2. For each s ≤ t and u < r, let σ2s,u be the
implicational substitution as in Lemma 4.11, so that
ξ2s ◦ σu ≡ σ2s,u ◦ ξ2s . (35)
Since σ2s,u(pi2s+j) =
(
ξ2s(σu(pi))
)ph′2s+j where ph′ = H(σu(pi)), we see readily that σ2s,u is
given by formulas of size 2O(s), and there are IPC→,∧-F proofs of (35) constructible in time
2O(s).
By induction on s ≤ t, we construct IPC→,∧-CF -derivations πs of ξ2s(Φ) from assump-
tions that are implicational substitution instances of Φ as follows.
Let π0 be the trivial derivation of Φ from itself. Assume that πs has already been con-
structed, we will build πs+1. We start by taking ξ2s(π), which is a derivation of ξ2s+1(Φ) from
assumptions ξ2s(σu(Φ)), u < r. Using short proofs of (35), we include subderivations of every
ξ2s(σu(Φ)) from σ2s,u(ξ2s(Φ)). Finally, for each u < r, we include σ2s,u(πs) as a derivation of
σ2s,u(ξ2s(Φ)).
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Since we are working with circuits, we can write σ2s,u(πs) in such a way that it includes
only one copy of each substituted variable, hence roughly,
|σ2s,u(πs)| = |πs|+
∑
i<k
j<2s
|σ2s,u(pi2s+j)|.
Consequently,
|πs+1| = r|πs|+ 2
O(s),
and this recurrence resolves to
|πs| = 2
O(s).
For s = t = log2 n, we obtain an IPC→,∧-CF -derivation πt of size 2
O(t) = nO(1) of ξn(Φ) from
implicational substitution instances of Φ, say {τv(Φ) : v < m}. It is clear from the recursive
description that πt can also be constructed in polynomial time.
Using (31) and the feasible deduction theorem, we can transform πt into an IPC→,∧-CF
proof of the implicational circuit
{τv(Φ) : v < m} → Φ
∧n.
By Proposition 4.9, we can transform it into an IPC→-CF proof, which we can turn into an
(IPC→ +Φ)-CF proof of Φ
∧n by modus ponens. 
We can immediately generalize Theorem 4.14 in the spirit of Theorem 4.3:
Corollary 4.15 Let P be a standard L-EF system for a si logic L whose proper axiom is an
implicational formula satisfying the conditions of Lemma 4.11.
Given a P -proof π of a formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof π′ of ϕ
with the following properties:
(i) The only conjunctions occurring in π′ are subformulas of ϕ.
(ii) The only disjunctions occurring in π′ are subformulas of ϕ, and the only instances of (9)
in π′ are with γ a subformula of ϕ which is a variable, a disjunction, or ⊥.
(iii) If ϕ is positive, then ⊥ does not occur in π′. Otherwise the only instances of (10) in π′
are with γ a variable from ϕ.
Proof: Let ϕˆ be the implicational formula from Corollary 3.10. We can construct in poly-
nomial time its L-EF proof, hence also an L→-EF proof by Theorem 4.14. We apply the
substitution σ from Corollary 3.10 to this proof. This reintroduces subformulas of ϕ, but no
other formula fragments, hence the desired restrictions on non-→ connectives in the proof
are satisfied. The proof now ends with a formula of the form ∆ → ϕ, where ∆ consists of
instances of (4)–(10) satisfying the required conditions; we include them as actual axioms,
and derive ϕ by modus ponens. 
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The whole construction can be easily adapted to {→,∧,⊥}-circuits. In Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8
and Proposition 4.9 we handle ⊥ as if it were an extra variable. If Φ is a {→,⊥}-formula
whose head is a variable, Definition 4.10 works unchanged; if H(Φ) = ⊥, we have
ξn(Φ)↔
(
ξn(Φ)
)⊥
in place of (31), and we duly define Φ∧n =
(
ξn(Φ)
)⊥
. (However, when this happens, Φ is
a negated formula, hence IPC + Φ is either IPC or inconsistent; this is not an interesting
case.) The same argument as in Lemma 4.11 yields:
Lemma 4.16 If Φ is an {→,⊥}-formula, the following are equivalent.
(i) (IPC+Φ)→,⊥ = IPC→,⊥ +Φ.
(ii) (IPC→,∧,⊥ +Φ)→,⊥ = IPC→,⊥ +Φ.
(iii) IPC→,⊥ +Φ proves Φ
∧n for all n ∈ ω.
(iv) IPC→,⊥ +Φ proves Φ
∧2. 
In the end, we obtain the following version of Corollary 4.15.
Theorem 4.17 Let P be a standard L-EF system for a si logic L whose proper axiom is an
{→,⊥}-formula satisfying the conditions of Lemma 4.16.
Given a P -proof π of a formula ϕ, we can construct in polynomial time a P -proof π′ of ϕ
with the following properties:
(i) The only conjunctions occurring in π′ are subformulas of ϕ.
(ii) The only disjunctions occurring in π′ are subformulas of ϕ, and the only instances of (9)
in π′ are with γ a subformula of ϕ which is a variable, a disjunction, or ⊥.
(iii) The only instances of (10) in π′ are with γ a variable from ϕ. 
4.3 Exponential separation
The exponential speed-up of SF over EF exhibited in Corollary 3.7 applies to IPC and many
other si logics, but not to their fragments, despite the tautologies being purely implicational.
We will close this gap by showing that the tautologies have short (poly-time constructible)
IPC→-SF proofs. Notice that Theorem 4.3 (or rather its SF -version, as mentioned there)
provides poly-time constructible IPC→,∧-SF proofs of these tautologies. Unfortunately, elim-
ination of ∧ in Section 4.2 does not work for SF systems, hence we will have to resort to an
ad hoc argument to get it down all the way to IPC→. Similarly to the proofs of [12, L. 6.26,29],
we will start from classical proofs of the tautologies, and judiciously replace bits and pieces
to obtain the desired result.
In order to extract IPC→ proofs out of CPC proofs, we will employ an implicational
version of the negative (Glivenko) translation. Hopefully, this may be of independent interest,
hence the argument is not completely ad hoc after all.
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Definition 4.18 The class of negative {→,⊥}-formulas is the smallest class of formulas such
that
• if Γ is a (possibly empty) sequence of variables and negative formulas, then Γ→ ⊥ is a
negative formula.
Given a negative formula ϕ, and a variable u, let ϕu denote the result of replacing ⊥ with u
in ϕ.
Proposition 4.19 Given a CPC-F proof of a negative formula ϕ, we can construct in poly-
nomial time an IPC→-F proof of ϕ
u.
Proof: It will be convenient to formulate classical logic with unbounded fan-in NAND as the
only connective; we will write it as Φ, where Φ is a sequence of formulas. It is easy to check
that the one-sided sequent7 calculus with the following rules is a complete proof system for
proving unsatisfiability of sequences of NAND-formulas, p-equivalent to Frege:
• the usual structural rules of exchange, contraction, and weakening;
• initial sequents Φ,Φ;
• the cut rule
Γ,Φ Γ,Φ
Γ
.
Now, if we identify Φ with Φ → ⊥, then NAND-formulas are exactly the variables and
negative formulas. If Γ = 〈ϕi : i < n〉, let us write Γ
u = 〈ϕui : i < n〉. Then given a proof
Γ0; Γ1; . . . ; Γn of the unsatisfiability of Γ = Γn in the above system, we consider the sequence
of formulas
Γu0 → u; . . . ; Γ
u
n → u
and make it an IPC→-F proof of Γ
u → u: structural rules are handled by Lemma 2.3 (i),
initial sequents translate to the tautologies
(Φu → u)→ Φu → u,
and the cut rule translates to
Γu → Φu → u Γu → (Φu → u)→ u
Γu → u
,
which has a short derivation by Lemma 2.3 (ii).
Finally, if ϕ is a negative formula, it has the form Γ → ⊥, where Γ consists of negative
formulas and variables. A classical Frege proof of ϕ can be transformed into an unsatisfiability
proof for the sequent Γ, which we translate to an IPC→-F proof of the formula (Γ
u → u) = ϕu
as above. 
7Here, the meaning of a sequent Γ = 〈ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1〉 is the conjunction
∧
i<n
ϕi. Think of it as representing
the two-sided sequent Γ =⇒ .
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Definition 4.20 Given a monotone formula ϕ, we define a negative formula ∼ϕ equivalent
to ¬ϕ as follows:
∼p = p→ ⊥,
∼(ϕ ∨ ψ) = (∼ϕ→ ∼ψ → ⊥)→ ⊥,
∼(ϕ ∧ ψ) = (∼ϕ→ ⊥)→ (∼ψ → ⊥)→ ⊥,
∼⊥ = ⊥ → ⊥,
∼⊤ = ⊥.
Using (22), it is easy to see that (∼ϕ)u is equivalent in IPC to ϕ → u. Thus, it should
be obvious that the formulas below have short IPC-F proofs. However, this does not give
IPC→-F proofs, as the formulas ϕ → u are meaningless as such in IPC→ (in fact, we
essentially introduced ∼ϕ and (∼ϕ)u to have a stand-in for ϕ → u). Thus, we need to work
a little harder.
Lemma 4.21 Let ϕ and ψ be monotone formulas. There are polynomial-time constructible
IPC→-F proofs of ((
(∼ϕ)u → u
)
→ u
)
⇄ (∼ϕ)u, (36)(
∼(ϕ ∨ ψ)
)u
→ (∼ϕ)u,
(
∼(ϕ ∨ ψ)
)u
→ (∼ψ)u, (37)
(∼ϕ)u → (∼ψ)u →
(
∼(ϕ ∨ ψ)
)u
, (38)
(∼ϕ)u →
(
∼(ϕ ∧ ψ)
)u
, (∼ψ)u →
(
∼(ϕ ∧ ψ)
)u
, (39)
(∼ϕ)v→u ⇄
(
v → (∼ϕ)u
)
, (40)
(v → u)→ (∼ϕ)v → (∼ϕ)u. (41)
Proof: (36) follows from (22), as (∼ϕ)u is of the form Γ→ u. Then it is straightforward to
show (37)–(39).
(40): Clearly, v →
(
(v → u)⇄ u
)
gives short proofs of
v →
(
(∼ϕ)v→u ⇄ (∼ϕ)u
)
.
Then we can derive (
v → (∼ϕ)u
)
⇄
(
v → (∼ϕ)v→u
)
⇄ (∼ϕ)v→u,
using the fact that (∼ϕ)v→u is of the form Γ→ v → u.
(41): For any occurrence of a subformula ψ ⊆ ϕ, we define a set of formulas Γψ by top-
to-bottom induction as follows. We put Γϕ = ∅. If ψ = ψL ∨ ψR, then ΓψL = ΓψR = Γψ. If
ψ = ψL ∧ ψR, we put ΓψL = Γψ, and ΓψR = Γψ ∪ {ψL}. Let
Γuψ =
{
(∼χ)u → u : χ ∈ Γψ
}
,
ψu∗ = Γ
u
ψ → (∼ψ)
u.
We will construct proofs of
(v → u)→ ψv∗ → ψ
u
∗ (42)
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by induction on ψ ⊆ ϕ, where we order the subformulas so that the left child of ψ and
its subformulas come before the right child and its subformulas, which come before ψ. In
particular, all formulas in Γψ come before ψ. Notice that for ψ = ϕ, (42) is just (41).
Let ψ = p be a variable. If Γψ is empty, (42) is
(v → u)→ (p→ v)→ (p→ u).
Otherwise Γψ = {χ} ∪ Γχ for some χ coming before ψ. We have
ψu∗ ⇄
(
Γuχ →
(
(∼χ)u → u
)
→ p→ u
)
⇄
(
p→ Γuχ → (∼χ)
u
)
⇄ (p→ χu∗)
by (36), hence (42) follows from the induction hypothesis for χ.
If ψ = ψL ∧ ψR, then
(ψR)
u
∗ ⇄
(
Γuψ →
(
(∼ψL)
u → u
)
→ (∼ψR)
u
)
⇄
(
Γuψ → (∼ψ)
u
)
⇄ ψu∗ ,
hence the induction hypothesis for ψR immediately yields (42) for ψ.
If ψ = ψL ∨ ψR, we have
(ψL)
u
∗ ⇄
(
Γuψ → (∼ψL)
u
)
, (ψR)
u
∗ ⇄
(
Γuψ → (∼ψR)
u
)
.
Thus, we can derive
(v → u)→
(
Γvψ → (∼ψ)
v
)
→
(
Γuψ → (∼ψL)
u
)
(v → u)→
(
Γvψ → (∼ψ)
v
)
→
(
Γuψ → (∼ψR)
u
)
using (37) and the induction hypothesis, whence
(v → u)→
(
Γvψ → (∼ψ)
v
)
→
(
Γuψ → (∼ψ)
u
)
using (38). 
Theorem 4.22 There is a sequence of implicational formulas that have polynomial-time con-
structible IPC→-SF proofs, but require L-EF proofs of size 2
nΩ(1) for any si logic L with
unbounded branching.
Proof: A somewhat simplified version of the implicational tautologies ϕn from Corollary 3.7,
translating the tautologies (19) from Theorem 3.2, can be written as
((
∼
∧
i<n
(pi ∨ p
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
((
∼
∧
i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)v
→ u
)
→
((
∼
∧
i<n
(ri ∨ r
′
i)
)w
→ u
)
→
(
∼γ(~p,~s, ~s′)
)v
→
(
∼δ(~p′, ~r, ~r′)
)w
→ u, (43)
where γ and δ are monotone. Since (19) has short classical Frege proofs, so does
¬∼
∧
i<n
(pi ∨ p
′
i)→ ¬∼
∧
i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)→ ¬∼
∧
i<n
(ri ∨ r
′
i)→ ∼γ(~p,~s,
~s′)→ ∼δ(~p′, ~r, ~r′)→ ⊥,
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hence using Proposition 4.19, we can construct short IPC→-F proofs of((
∼
∧
i<n
(pi ∨ p
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
((
∼
∧
i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
((
∼
∧
i<n
(ri ∨ r
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
(
∼γ(~p,~s, ~s′)
)u
→
(
∼δ(~p′, ~r, ~r′)
)u
→ u. (44)
Putting
Γ(~p, ~p′, ~r, ~r′, u) =
{(
∼
∧
i<n
(pi ∨ p
′
i)
)u
→ u,
(
∼
∧
i<n
(ri ∨ r
′
i)
)u
→ u, (∼δ)u
}
,
we derive
Γ→ (∼γ)v →
((
∼
∧
i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→ (v → u)→ u
using (41). We proceed to prove
Γ→ (∼γ)v →
((
∼
∧
j≤i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
((
∼
∧
i<j
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)v
→ u
)
→ u (45)
by induction on j ≤ n. Assume we have (45) for j. Note that
(
∼
∧
j≤i<n(si∨s
′
i)
)u
is equivalent
to (
(sj → u)→ (s
′
j → u)→ u
)
→
(
∼
∧
j<i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)u
.
Thus, if we substitute ⊤ for sj, and sj → v for v, we obtain
Γ→
(
∼γ(sj/⊤)
)sj→v → ((∼ ∧
j<i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
((
∼
∧
i<j
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)sj→v
→ u
)
→ u.
(It is essential here that neither sj nor v occur in Γ.) Using (40) and short proofs of
(∼γ)v → sj →
(
∼γ(sj/⊤)
)v
,
we obtain
Γ→ (∼γ)v →
((
∼
∧
j<i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
[(
sj →
(
∼
∧
i<j
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)v)
→ u
]
→ u.
A symmetric argument gives the same formula with s′j in place of sj. Putting ϕ =
∧
i<j(si∨s
′
i),
we have(
sj → (∼ϕ)
v
)
→
(
s′j → (∼ϕ)
v
)
→
(
(∼ϕ)v → v
)
→
(
(sj → v)→ (s
′
j → v)→ v
)
→ v︸ ︷︷ ︸(
∼
∧
i≤j(si ∨ s
′
i)
)v ,
and using
x→ y → z ⊢ ((x→ u)→ u)→ ((y → u)→ u)→ (z → u)→ u,
we can derive
Γ→ (∼γ)v →
((
∼
∧
j<i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)u
→ u
)
→
((
∼
∧
i≤j
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)v
→ u
)
→ u,
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which is (45) for j + 1.
In the end, j = n gives
Γ→ (∼γ)v →
((
∼
∧
i<n
(si ∨ s
′
i)
)v
→ u
)
→ u.
Repeating the same argument with δ, w, ri, r
′
i in place of γ, v, si, s
′
i yields (43). 
5 Conclusion
The diverse results in this paper show that by and large, the proof complexity of common
calculi for intuitionistic logic is concentrated on implicational formulas. On the one hand, we
do not miss anything substantial by restricting attention to the lengths of proofs of purely
implicational tautologies. On the other hand, we may assume intuitionistic proofs to come in
a sort of normal form where the bulk of the proof takes place in the implicational fragment
of IPC, except for a small predetermined set of nonimplicational axioms that essentially
reconstruct the nonimplicational subformulas of the tautology being proved. To some extent
the same is true of other superintuitionistic logics.
Nevertheless, our work inevitably revealed various rough spots where our methods leave
something to be desired, especially in connection with extensions of intuitionistic logic. In
particular, our results on elimination of conjunctions from proofs in Section 4.2 may be limited
more by the specific method we employ rather than intrinsically:
Question 5.1 Can we extend Theorem 4.14 to si logics whose axioms involve disjunctions,
under suitable conditions on their axioms?
Question 5.2 Can we extend Theorem 4.14 to IPC-SF or other substitution Frege systems?
Recall that we stated another problem as Question 4.13.
For Question 5.2, it is unclear whether we should expect a positive or a negative answer.
Indeed, a superpolynomial speedup of IPC-SF over IPC→-SF would be an exciting result.
Likewise, it would be very interesting if we could turn some of the lower bounds in Appendix B
into lower bounds on the lengths of proofs.
Let us also mention the following open problems in the area of intuitionistic proof com-
plexity.
Question 5.3 Does IPC-F polynomially simulate IPC-EF?
Question 5.4 Can we prove an unconditional lower bound on IPC-SF proofs?
While neither question is particularly connected to implicational fragments, we note that they
would be interesting to resolve even for proper fragments of IPC, or another si logic.
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A Axiomatization of fragments
This section makes an exposition of a result on fragments of si logics originally due to
Wron´ski [18], related to elimination of connectives from Section 4.
We are interested in the following question: if C is a set of connectives, is it true that
whenever L is a si logic axiomatized over IPC by a C-formula Φ, the C-fragment of L is
axiomatized by Φ over IPCC? In other words, is every axiomatic extension of IPCC the
C-fragment of a si logic? While trivially IPCC+Φ ⊆ (IPC+Φ)C , this inclusion may a priori
be strict: a proof of a C-formula ϕ in IPC+Φ may use substitution instances σ(Φ) involving
arbitrary connectives, whereas a proof in IPCC +Φ only allows substitutions by C-formulas.
Let us first properly introduce some terminology.
Definition A.1 Let C,C0, C1 ⊆ CIPC be such that → ∈ C ⊆ C0 ∩ C1. We say that IPCC0
is hereditarily C-conservative over IPCC1 if for all sets of C-formulas X, the C-fragment of
IPCC0 +X is included in IPCC1 +X.
Observation A.2 Let C,C0, C1 be as in Definition A.1. If C0 ⊆ C1, then IPCC0 is heredi-
tarily C-conservative over IPCC1 .
Let C ′, C ′0, C
′
1 also obey the restrictions from Definition A.1, and C
′ ⊆ C, C ′0 ⊆ C0, and
C1 ⊆ C
′
1. If IPCC0 is hereditarily C-conservative over IPCC1 , then IPCC′0 is hereditarily
C ′-conservative over IPCC′1 . 
A partial positive answer is provided by Theorem 4.3, which shows that we do not need
substitutions with ∨ or ⊥ if these connectives do not appear in Φ or ϕ:
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Corollary A.3 If C,C0, C1 are as in Definition A.1, and ∧ ∈ C1, then IPCC0 is hereditarily
C-conservative over IPCC1 . 
However, these results for ∨ and ⊥ cannot be directly generalized to ∧—in fact, Obser-
vation A.2 and Corollary A.3 cannot be improved:
Theorem A.4 (Wron´ski [18]) Let C,C0, C1 be as in Definition A.1. The following are
equivalent:
(i) IPCC0 is hereditarily C-conservative over IPCC1 .
(ii) ∧ ∈ C1 or C0 ⊆ C1.
(Wron´ski only explicitly mentions the cases with C = C1, but his argument proves the
formulation given here. He also considers fragments without implication, which we are not
interested in.)
For completeness, we will prove Theorem A.4 below. In view of Observation A.2 and
Corollary A.3, it suffices to show the three non-conservativity results in the next proposition.8
We assume familiarity with basic universal algebra and algebraic methods in propositional
logics, see e.g. [2, 1]. For typographic convenience, we will write L ⊢ ϕ instead of ⊢L ϕ.
Proposition A.5
(i) IPC→,∧ is not hereditarily →-conservative over IPC→,∨,⊥.
(ii) IPC→,⊥ is not hereditarily →-conservative over IPC→,∨.
(iii) IPC→,∨ is not hereditarily →-conservative over IPC→,⊥.
Proof: We will work for the moment with the implicational fragment.
IPC→ is regularly algebraizable wrt the class of→-subreducts of Heyting algebras, which
is the variety of BCKW (aka Hilbert) algebras, hence axiomatic extensions of IPC→ corre-
spond to subvarieties V ⊆ BCKW. By Diego’s theorem [5, §5.4], BCKW is locally finite,
hence V is generated by its finite subdirectly irreducible (sdi) algebras. Congruences on a
BCKW-algebra 〈A, 1,→〉 are determined by filters (subsets F ⊆ A such that 1 ∈ F , and
a, a→ b ∈ F implies b ∈ F ). Every element a ∈ A generates the principal filter a↑. It follows
that A is sdi iff it has an opremum: a largest element strictly below 1.
Let A be a finite sdi BCKW-algebra with opremum o. The characteristic formula of A is
the formula
ϕA = ΞA → po
in variables {pa : a ∈ A}, where the set of formulas ΞA consists of
(pa → pb)→ pa→b, pa→b → (pa → pb)
8We mention that item (iii) is relevant to [6].
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for a, b ∈ A. Clearly, ϕA is invalid in A under the valuation v(pa) = a. On the other hand, let
v be a valuation in a BCKW-algebra B such that v(ϕA) 6= 1. The filter generated by v(ΞA),
which is
F = {b ∈ B : v(ΞA)→ b = 1},
does not contain v(po), hence v induces a valuation vF on the quotient algebra B/F such that
vF (ΞA) = 1, and vF (po) < 1. Then vF (pa→b) = vF (pa) → vF (pb) by the definition of ΞA,
hence the mapping f : A → B/F defined by f(a) = vF (pa) is a homomorphism. Its kernel
does not contain the generator o of the least nontrivial congruence on A, hence f is in fact
an embedding. Thus, we have established that B 2 ϕA iff A ∈ S(H(B)).
With A as above, let B be a sdi algebra in H(S(P(A))). If B is finite, A 2 ϕB , hence
B ∈ S(H(A)). If B were infinite, let B′ be its finite(ly generated) subalgebra including the
opremum. Then B′ ∈ S(H(A)) by the previous argument, which gives a contradiction if we
choose |B′| > |A|.9
Now, assume that A is a finite sdi IPCC1-algebra, and that IPCC0 is hereditarily →-
conservative over IPCC1 . Let X be the set of →-formulas valid in A. We have IPCC1 +X 0
ϕA as witnessed by A, hence IPCC0 + X 0 ϕA, which means that there exists an IPCC0-
algebra B such that B ↾→ ∈ H(S(P (A ↾→))), and B 2 ϕA. We may assume B is sdi. Since
B↾→ and B have the same congruences, B↾→ is also sdi. By the above, B↾→ ∈ S(H(A↾→));
on the other hand, B 2 ϕA implies A ↾→ ∈ S(H(B ↾→)), and as A is finite, this gives
A ↾→ ≃ B ↾→. In other words, A itself must be an IPCC0-algebra to begin with. (Note
that → determines ≤, hence also the lattice operations ∧,∨,⊥. Thus, A ↾→ has at most one
expansion to an IPCC0-algebra.)
It remains to find specific counterexamples for the three statements.
(i): Let B be the Heyting algebra with domain {1, o, a, b, c, d,⊥}, where⊥ < c < b < o < 1,
⊥ < d < a < o, and d < b. Put A = Br{d}, and note that A is a {→,∨,⊥}-subalgebra of B,
and it is sdi with opremum o. However, A is not an IPC→,∧-algebra, being a non-distributive
lattice.
For (ii), let B be the Heyting algebra with domain {1, o, a, b,⊥}, where ⊥ < {a, b} < o < 1,
and A be its {→,∨}-subalgebra B r {⊥}, which is sdi, and has no least element.
For (iii), we can use B = {1, o, a, b,m, c, d,⊥}, where ⊥ < {c, d} < m < {a, b} < o < 1,
and A = B r {m}, which is a {→,⊥}-subalgebra of B, but not an IPC→,∨-algebra, as c
and d have no join in A. 
Example A.6 To illustrate the abstract nonsense with actual formulas, put
ϕ =
(
(x→ y)→ z
)
→
(
(y → x)→ z
)
→ z,
ψ = (w → x)→ (w → y)→
(
(x→ y)→ z
)
→
(
(y → x)→ z
)
→ z.
Clearly, IPC→,∧ + ψ and IPC→,⊥ + ψ derive ϕ by substituting x ∧ y or ⊥ for w. However,
IPC→,∨ + ψ 0 ϕ, as ψ is valid in the algebra A in the proof of (ii) above, but ϕ is not.
9Alternatively, we could show that BCKW is a congruence-distributive variety, and apply Jo´nsson’s lemma
for the slightly weaker conclusion B ∈ H(S(A)).
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Note that IPC + ϕ = IPC + (x → y) ∨ (y → x) is just the Go¨del–Dummett logic LC,
and one can show IPC→,... + ϕ = LC→,...; cf. Example 4.12.
B Complexity of formulas in intuitionistic logic
In this section, we present several lower bounds on formula complexity in intuitionistic frag-
ments. Our main aim is to show that constraints employed in Section 4.2 are necessary. That
is, Lemma 2.2 tells us that every formula ϕ can be in IPC transformed into a conjunction∧
i<m
ϕi (46)
of ∧-free formulas while not introducing any new connectives; for the {→,∧} and {→,∧,⊥}
fragments, this can be done in such a way that m is at most the number of variables (plus
1 for ⊥), and the circuit size of ϕi is polynomial in the circuit size of ϕ (Lemma 4.7). We
will show that m needs to be exponentially large for formulas with ∨ (Proposition B.1), and
that the formula size of ϕi may need to be exponentially large even for {→,∧}-formulas
(Proposition B.8 and Corollary B.10). In the course of establishing the latter, we will also
prove a linear lower bound on implication nesting depth (Proposition B.3).
We first deal with disjunctions.
Proposition B.1 Let L ⊆ KC be a si logic, and ϕ be a monotone formula. The optimal (in
terms of m) expression of ϕ as a conjunction
⊢L ϕ↔
∧
i<m
ϕi (47)
with ϕi ∧-free is the (unique) nonredundant monotone conjunctive normal form of ϕ. In
particular, the formula
ϕ =
∨
i<n
(pi ∧ qi)
of size O(n) cannot be written as a conjunction of less than 2n ∧-free formulas.
Proof: Assume ϕ uses the variables {pi : i < n}. Consider the model M = 〈P([n]),⊆,〉,
where [n] = {0, . . . , n − 1}, and I  pi iff i ∈ I. Since any formula defines an up-set, and
each cone I↑ in M is definable by
∧
i∈I pi, every formula is in M equivalent to a monotone
formula.
In fact, we claim that any {→,∨,⊥}-formula ψ is in M equivalent to ⊤ or to a (possibly
empty) disjunction of variables. This follows by induction on the complexity of ψ: it is enough
to check that
M 
(∨
i∈I
pi →
∨
j∈J
pj
)
↔


⊤ if I ⊆ J ,∨
j∈J
pj otherwise.
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To see this, assume i ∈ IrJ , and K 2
∨
j∈J pj, which means J ∩K = ∅. Then K
′ = K ∪{i}
satisfies K ≤ K ′ 
∨
I pi, and K
′ 2
∨
J pj, as J ∩K
′ = ∅. Thus,
K 2
∨
i∈I
pi →
∨
j∈J
pj.
Now, if (47) holds, then ϕ is in M equivalent to a monotone formula
ϕ∗ =
∧
i<m
ϕ∗i ,
where each ϕ∗i is a disjunction of variables (or ⊤, which can be omitted). However, if α, β are
monotone formulas, then M  α → β only when α → β is provable (in IPC, L, or CPC,
this is all equivalent): if v is a variable assignment such that v(α) = 1 and v(β) = 0, then
I = {i : v(pi) = 1} satisfies I  α and I 2 β. Thus,
⊢ ϕ↔ ϕ∗,
where ϕ∗ is a monotone CNF with m clauses. 
Remark B.2 In CPC, any formula is equivalent to a {→,⊥}-formula, and any positive
formula ϕ can be written as a conjunction of m {→}-formulas, where m is the minimal length
of a conjunction of variables that implies ϕ (for monotone ϕ, this is the length of the shortest
conjunction in its monotone DNF): indeed, if
∧
i∈I pi implies ϕ, then
ϕ↔
∧
i∈I
(pi ∨ ϕ),
and a Boolean function can be expressed by a {→}-formula iff it majorizes a variable.
Now we turn to {→,∧}-formulas. While every {→,∧}-circuit is equivalent to a poly-
nomially larger conjunction of {→}-circuits, we will prove that a {→,∧}-formula may need
exponential size when expressed as a conjunction of ∧-free formulas (46).
First however, it is not hard to see that if ϕ is a {→,∧}-formula of depth d, we can
make the size of (46) to be |ϕ|O(d); this is a quasipolynomial bound in the ideal case when
d = O(log |ϕ|). Thus, if we want exponential lower bounds on the size of (46), we should
better make sure that ϕ cannot be written by a formula of low depth.
In CPC, every formula can be transformed into a polynomially larger formula of loga-
rithmic depth by Spira’s lemma. In contrast, we will show that in IPC, formulas may require
linear depth, even using a rather relaxed measure—we only count the nesting of implications
on the left:
ld→(p) = ld→(⊥) = ld→(⊤) = 0,
ld→(ϕ ∧ ψ) = ld→(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max{ld→(ϕ), ld→(ψ)},
ld→(ϕ→ ψ) = max{ld→(ϕ) + 1, ld→(ψ)}.
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◦ x0
 
 ✒
❅
❅■
◦y1 ◦x1
❅
❅■
 
 ✒
❅
❅■
◦ x2 ◦ y2
 
 ✒
❅
❅■
 
 ✒
◦y3 ◦x3
❅
❅■
 
 ✒
❅
❅■
◦ x4 ◦ y4
 
 ✒
❅
❅■
 
 ✒
◦y5 ◦x5
❅■  ✒❅■
...
...
Figure 1: Kripke frame used in Proposition B.3
Let Un = {ϕ : ld→(ϕ) ≤ n}; U1-formulas are also called NNIL. These formula classes were
studied in [17]. There are only finitely many Un-formulas up to equivalence over a finite set
of variables.
If M = 〈M,≤,〉 is a Kripke model for a finite set of variables V , and x, y ∈ M , let us
write
x→n y iff ∀ϕ ∈ Un (x  ϕ⇒ y  ϕ).
Notice that →n is transitive, and contains ≤. Clearly,
x→0 y iff ∀p ∈ V (x  p⇒ y  p).
By a variant of a characterization from [17], we have x →n y if and only if there is a family
of relations 〈⇒k : k ≤ n〉 such that
(i) x′ ⇒n y for some x
′ ≥ x;
(ii) u⇒k v implies u→0 v;
(iii) u⇒k+1 v implies v ⇒k u;
(iv) whenever u⇒k+1 v ≤ v
′, there is u′ such that u ≤ u′ ⇒k+1 v
′.
(The reader should think of u⇒k v as an under-approximation of u→k v →k−1 u.)
Let us define the formula
αn(p0, . . . , pn) = (· · · ((p0 → p1)→ p2)→ · · · )→ pn (48)
for n ≥ 0. That is, α0 = p0, and αn+1 = (αn → pn+1).
Proposition B.3 If L is a si logic included in KC+BW2, and n ≥ 1, the implicational
Un-formula αn is not equivalent over L to any Un−1-formula.
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Proof: We consider the model M = 〈M,≤,〉, where
M = {xn : n ≥ 0} ∪ {yn : n ≥ 1},
xn < xn−1, xn+1 < yn < xn−1,
y1  p0,
xn, yn  pn+1.
(See Figure 1.) A straightforward induction on n shows
u  αn iff u ≥ yn+1,
thus the result will follow if we prove yn+1 →n−1 xn+1 (in fact, also xn+1 →n yn+1). To this
end, it is enough to define relations ⇒n for n ∈ ω by
⇒n = idM ∪ {〈xm, ym〉 : m ≥ n+ 1} ∪ {〈ym, xm〉 : m ≥ n+ 2},
and observe that the conditions (i)–(iv) from the characterization of →n are satisfied. 
Definition B.4 With every {→,⊥}-formula ϕ(~p), we associate a rooted tree Tϕ whose nodes
are labelled by variables pi or by ⊥ (these will be collectively called atoms) using the following
inductive definition: if
ϕ = ϕ0 → · · · → ϕn−1 → v,
where n ≥ 0, and v is an atom (i.e., v = H(ϕ)), then Tϕ has a root labelled by v with children
Tϕ0 , . . . , Tϕn−1 .
More generally, we associate each ∧-free formula with a labelled forest Tϕ: if ϕ is an atom,
then Tϕ is the singleton tree labelled ϕ; if ϕ = ψ ∨ χ, then Tϕ is the disjoint union of Tψ
and Tχ; if ϕ = ψ → χ, then Tϕ is obtained from Tχ by attaching copies of all trees from Tψ
as children to roots of all trees of Tχ. For example, this is Tp∨q→r∨s:
• r
✁
✁✕
❆
❆❑
•p • q
• s
✁
✁✕
❆
❆❑
•p • q
A path in Tϕ is a sequence of labels of nodes x0, . . . , xn ∈ Tϕ, where xi+1 is the parent
of xi for each i < n, and xn is a root.
Lemma B.5 Let M be the Kripke model considered in the proof of Proposition B.3. Put
βn = αn → pn and γn = αn ∧ pn+1 for n ≥ 0; notice that in M, β0 ≡ ⊤, β1 ≡ α0 ≡ p0, and
γ0 ≡ p1.
Every {→,∨}-formula is in M equivalent to an implicational formula, namely ⊤, pn, αn,
or βn for some n ≥ 1. A ∧-free formula is equivalent to an implicational formula as above,
or to ⊥. An arbitrary formula is equivalent either to one of the above mentioned, or to γn for
some n ≥ 1.
If ϕ is a {→,⊥}-formula not equivalent to ⊤, then Tϕ has a path of the following form,
depending on the canonical equivalent of ϕ:
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pn, n ≥ 1 pn
⊥ ⊥
p0 ≡ α0 ≡ β1 p0p
2k
1
αn, n ≥ 1 p0p
2k1+1
1 . . . p
2kn+1
n
βn, n ≥ 2 p0p
2k1+1
1 . . . p
2kn−1+1
n−1 p
2kn+2
n
The same also holds for ∧-free formulas ϕ not equivalent to ⊤ or βn for n ≥ 2.
Proof: Recall that u  αn iff u ≥ yn+1. Also, we have u  βn iff u ≥ yn or (for n > 1)
u ≥ yn−1; and u  γn iff u ≥ xn.
Let F = {⊤, pn, αn, βn : n ≥ 1}, and F
⊥ = F ∪ {⊥}. In M, every negated formula is
equivalent to ⊤ or ⊥, and for all n ≥ 1, M satisfies
pn → βn, βn → pn+1, pn → αn, αn → βn+1. (49)
Using this, it is not hard to verify that for any ψ,χ ∈ F⊥, ψ → χ is equivalent to ⊤ or χ,
and ψ ∨ χ is equivalent to ψ or χ, with only the following exceptions, where n ≥ 1 (n > 1 in
the cases involving n− 1):
(αn−1 → pn) ≡ (βn → pn) ≡ αn,
(αn → pn) ≡ βn,
(αn ∨ pn+1) ≡ (αn ∨ βn) ≡ (αn ∨ αn−1) ≡ βn+1.

 (50)
This shows that F and F⊥ are closed under→ and ∨, hence every {→,∨}-formula is equivalent
to a formula from F , and every {→,∨,⊥}-formula to a formula from F⊥. A general formula is
equivalent to a conjunction of ∧-free formulas; using (49), the only cases where the conjunction
of elements of F⊥ is different from one of the conjuncts are αn ∧ βn ≡ pn, and αn ∧ αn+1 ≡
αn ∧ pn+1 = γn.
Assume ϕ is an {→,⊥}-formula not equivalent to ⊤. We can simplify ϕ by repeatedly
replacing subformulas ψ → χ with χ when equivalent, yielding a new formula ϕ′; this trans-
formation amounts to removing the subtree Tψ from Tϕ, hence any path in Tϕ′ is also a path
in Tϕ. Notice that in particular, all subformulas ψ equivalent to ⊤ get deleted. By (50), ϕ
′
contains no nontrivial formulas equivalent to pn for n ≥ 1 or to ⊥, and the only implications
left in ϕ′ have variables on the right-hand side, i.e., Tϕ′ consists of a single path. It is then
easy to check that this path must have the form given in the table.
Now, let ϕ be an {→,∨,⊥}-formula. We simplify it by replacing subformulas ψ → χ
with χ when equivalent (as above), and by replacing ψ ∨ χ with ψ or χ when this does not
change ϕ (up to equivalence). Let ϕ′ denote the resulting formula. This transformation again
amounts to removal of several subtrees from the forest Tϕ, hence every path in Tϕ′ is a path
in Tϕ. As before, ϕ
′ contains no nontrivial subformulas equivalent to pn for n ≥ 1, or to ⊥;
in particular, if ϕ′ itself is equivalent to one of those, it consists of a single symbol.
Assume ϕ′ is equivalent to αn; we will show that Tϕ′ is a path as given in the table by
induction on |ϕ′|. By (50), there is no nontrivial way to express α1 or α0 = β1 as a disjunction;
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this easily gives the result for n = 0, 1 as in the {→,⊥} case. Assume n ≥ 2. By (50), ϕ′ has
one of the forms
ψ → pn,
(ϕ′′ → pn)→ pn,
ψ ∨ χ→ pn,
where ψ ≡ αn−1, ϕ
′′ ≡ αn, χ is equivalent to pn, βn−1, or αn−2, and the disjunction may be
written in reverse order. In the first two cases, it suffices to apply the induction hypothesis
to ψ or ϕ′′ (resp.). The third case is actually impossible, as we could simplify the formula by
deleting the “ ∨ χ” part. 
Definition B.6 Let ϕ be a ∧-free formula. An occurrence of a subformula ψ in ϕ is unnested
if it is not within the left scope of an implication. That is, the set U(ϕ) of unnested occurrences
of subformulas of ϕ can be defined inductively by
U(v) = {v} if v is an atom,
U(ϕ→ ψ) = {ϕ→ ψ} ∪ U(ψ),
U(ϕ ∨ ψ) = {ϕ ∨ ψ} ∪ U(ϕ) ∪ U(ψ).
Notice that atoms in U(ϕ) are exactly the labels of roots of the trees in Tϕ.
Lemma B.7 Let ϕ be a ∧-free formula.
(i) If ⊤ ∈ U(ϕ), then ϕ ≡ ⊤.
(ii) If Tϕ has a path Pv, where v is an atom, then v ∈ U(ϕ). If moreover P is nonempty,
then ϕ has an unnested subformula of the form ψ → χ such that v ∈ U(χ), and Tψ has
a path P .
Proof: By induction on the complexity of ϕ. 
For simplicity, let us define the size of a formula as the number of symbols in Polish
notation, that is, the number of occurrences of all variables and connectives, disregarding
auxiliary characters (brackets, variable indices).
Proposition B.8 If L is a si logic included in KC+BW2, then any ∧-free formula L-
equivalent to
α∧2n = αn(p0,0 ∧ p0,1, p1,0 ∧ p1,1, . . . , pn−1,0 ∧ pn−1,1, pn)
must have size at least 2n+2 − 3.
Proof: Let ϕ be a ∧-free formula equivalent to α∧2n . For any f : [n]→ {0, 1}, we consider the
substitution
σf (pi,f(i)) = pi,
σf (pi,1−f(i)) = ⊤.
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Notice that σf (ϕ) ≡ σf (α
∧2
n ) ≡ αn. Let ϕf denote the formula σf (ϕ) with subformulas made
true by σf deleted. By Lemma B.5, Tϕf has a path of the form p0p
2k1+1
1 . . . p
2kn+1
n for some
k1, . . . , kn ≥ 0 (depending on f). Lifting it back to Tϕ, and using Lemma B.7, we can find a
sequence of occurrences of subformulas
ϕ = ψf,n,0 ⊇ ϕf,n,0 ⊇ ψf,n,1 ⊇ . . . ⊇ ϕf,n,2kn ⊇ ψf,n−1,0 ⊇ . . . ⊇ ϕf,1,2k1 ⊇ ψf,0,0 ⊇ ϕf,0,0
(51)
such that:
(i) ϕf,i,j ∈ U(ψf,i,j).
(ii) ϕf,i+1,j is an implication with premise ψf,i+1,j+1 for j < 2ki+1, or ψf,i,0 for j = 2ki+1.
(iii) pi,f(i) has an unnested occurrence (denoted vf,i,j) in ϕf,i,j. Here, “pn,f(n)” stands for pn.
(iv) There are no variables in U(ψf,i,j) other than p0,f(0), . . . , pn,f(n).
Claim 1 Let f, g : [n]→ {0, 1}, and i ≤ n.
(i) If i < n and f(i) 6= g(i), then ϕf,i,0 * ϕg,i,0.
(ii) vf,i,0 6= vg,i′,0 unless i = i
′, and f agrees with g on {i, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof:
(i): Assume that ϕf,i,0 is a suboccurrence of ϕg,i,0. Since each ψf,i′,j′ (except ψf,n,0) has
an appropriate ϕf,i′′,j′′ formula as its parent, it follows from (51) that ϕf,i′,j′ ⊆ ϕg,i,0 ⊆ ψf,i′,j′
for some i′ ≥ i and j′ ≤ 2ki′ . However, since ϕf,i′,j′ is unnested in ψf,i′,j′ , so must be ϕg,i,0,
hence pi,g(i) has an unnested occurrence in ψf,i′,j′ . This contradicts (iv) above.
(ii): Assume vf,i,0 = vg,i′,0. Since vf,i,0 is an occurrence of pi,f(i), we must have i = i
′, and
f(i) = g(i). If f(i′′) were different from g(i′′) for some i′′ > i, then ϕf,i′′,0 and ϕg,i′′,0 would
be incomparable by the first part of the claim, hence so would be their respective subformulas
vf,i,0 and vg,i,0.  (Claim 1)
The claim implies that
{
vf,i,0 : f : [n]→ {0, 1}, i ≤ n
}
consists of at least 2n + · · ·+ 20 =
2n+1 − 1 distinct occurrences of variables in ϕ, hence the total size of ϕ is at least 2n+2 − 3.

Remark B.9 The bound is tight: we can express α∧2n by an implicational formula of size
2n+2 − 3 using the recurrence
α∧20 = p0,
α∧2n+1 = α
∧2
n (pn/pn,0)→ α
∧2
n (pn/pn,1)→ pn+1.
Corollary B.10 If L is a si logic included in KC+BW2, and ϕ is a conjunction of ∧-free
formulas L-equivalent to
ξ2(αn) = αn(p0,0 ∧ p0,1, p1,0 ∧ p1,1, . . . , pn,0 ∧ pn,1),
then |ϕ| ≥ 2n+3 − 5.
Proof: If ϕ =
∧
i<m ϕi, then α
∧2
n+1 is equivalent to the formula ϕ0 → · · · → ϕm−1 → pn+1 of
size |ϕ|+ 2. 
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Example B.11 We may interpret Proposition B.8 as an explicit exponential separation be-
tween formula and circuit size in a fragment of intuitionistic logic, and the reader may wonder
whether there is such a separation also in the full intuitionistic language. This is indeed true,
and essentially well known. One can take for example the Rieger–Nishimura formulas
rn0 = ⊥, rn1 = p, rn2 = ¬p,
rn2n+3 = rn2n+1 ∨ rn2n+2,
rn2n+4 = rn2n+2 → rn2n+1
(see [5, Exm. 7.66]). Every intuitionistic formula in one variable ϕ(p) is equivalent to ⊤, or
to rnk for some k, and it is not difficult to estimate k = O(log |ϕ|). On the other hand,
rnk is defined by a circuit of size O(k). Thus, every intuitionistic formula in one variable
can be expressed by an exponentially smaller circuit. (In a sense, something even stronger
holds in classical logic, as every formula in one variable has circuit size O(1). However, the
intuitionistic bound is meaningful as unlike CPC, there are infinitely many nonequivalent
formulas in one variable in IPC.)
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